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I. INTRODUCTION
Interrogator: McConnell, what we're going to ask you basically is go-
ing to change your life, okay? Your life has changed
right now. Okay?
Suspect: Okay.
Interrogator: Uhm, it ain't going to be like it was before you were ar-
rested. Your actions from this point on dictate how
your life is going to be. Okay? Uhm, there were
some-there are some very, very important questions
Sgt. Sutton and I would like to ask you.... What we're
going to get at is the truth. And I already have all of
it, as to how things occurred, where they occurred, eve-
rything else. What I really need to get from you is the
whys and an explanation so that the world knows that
McConnell isn't a cold-hearted, stone killer. You're not
an assassin, you're not a serial killer, something hap-
pened that went wrong that day, 'cause I know murder
wasn't your intention.... The reason why can only
come from you. Okay? And that's what we're going
delve into. All right? Listen carefully.... You have
the right to remain silent.'
Over the past one-third of a century, no criminal procedure
decision has precipitated more controversy than Miranda v.
Arizona,2 the Warren Court's landmark police interrogation de-
cision. Decided in 1966, Miranda held that statements ob-
tained from a suspect as a result of custodial interrogation are
inadmissible unless the police conducting the interrogation first
warn the suspect of four specified rights, and the suspect vol-
untarily and intelligently waives those rights.3 From the time
it was decided until the present, Miranda has precipitated
criticism from both those who believe the decision has imposed
1. Interrogation Transcript of McConnell Adams, Oakland County Sher-
iffs Dep't, Mich. 3-14 (Dec. 31, 1996) (on file with authors).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See id. at 467-73.
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unreasonable restraints on law enforcement, as well as those
who believe it has provided insufficient protection to suspects
being questioned by the police. 4 In recent times, when first the
Burger Court and then the Rehnquist Court replaced the more
liberal Warren Court, conservative critics of Miranda have
preponderated. 5
From a constitutional standpoint, conservative critics have
maintained that, in light of Miranda's acknowledgment that its
warning and waiver requirements are not mandated by the
Constitution 6 and post-Miranda decisions' admission that the
Miranda safeguards are prophylactic rules designed to provide
suspects with additional Fifth Amendment protection,
7
Miranda lacks constitutional legitimacy and may properly be
replaced by legislative rules providing suspects with lesser
Fifth Amendment protection.8 In United States v. Dickerson9 in
early 1999, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit essentially ac-
cepted this argument, holding that since the Miranda safe-
guards are not constitutionally based, a 1968 congressional
statute, which replaced Miranda with the due process volun-
tariness test, preempts Miranda, rendering its requirements
inapplicable to federal cases.
From an empirical standpoint, commentators have recently
engaged in an animated debate relating to Miranda's effect on
law enforcement.' 0 In support of their claim that Miranda has
imposed significant costs on law enforcement, conservative
commentators rely on seemingly sophisticated methodologies,
4. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 865, 883-84 (1981) ("Miranda does not, any more than the due process
test, come directly to grips with the dilemma arising from our simultaneous
commitments to the privilege against self-incrimination and to a law enforce-
ment system in which police interrogation is perceived as a necessity.").
5. See, for example, Joseph D. Grano, Criminal Procedure: Moving from
the Accused as Victim to the Accused as Responsible Party, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 711 (1996) and Edwin Meese HI, Promoting Truth in the Court-
room, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271, 273 (1987), both of which characterize Miranda
as "truth-defeating." See also, e.g., Stephen Markman, The Missing Link of
Federal Criminal Justice Reform, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 542, 545
(1995) (arguing that the Miranda decision is indicative of "a pervasive will-
ingness to subordinate the truth-seeking function to other interests").
6. See 384 U.S. at 467-68.
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:
A Question ofArticle III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 106-11 (1985).
9. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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including a multiple regression time series of analysis of crime
clearance rates before and after Miranda.1'
Surprisingly, however, in assessing either Miranda's im-
pact on law enforcement or its viability as a constitutional deci-
sion, relatively little attention has been given to the ways in
which modern interrogators have adapted to Miranda.
When Miranda was decided, it generated considerable out-
rage, particularly among those associated with law enforce-
ment.12 Nevertheless, the decision was not completely unex-
pected. To scholars familiar with the Court's confession
decisions, Miranda represented the culmination of the Court's
effort, which had begun at least as early as the late 1950s,13 to
11. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A
Thirty Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1055, 1082-83 (1998). For a critique of Cassell's flawed method-
ologies, see generally Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 109 (1998). As Weisselberg notes, "Cassell's methodology is problem-
atic .... One, therefore, must make a series of foolhardy assumptions to con-
clude that any purported decrease in confession rates is due to Miranda,
rather than other factors." Id. at 174. For a critique of Cassell's and Fowles'
failed attempt to prove that Miranda has somehow "handcuffed law enforce-
ment" based on their multiple regression analysis of FBI clearance data, see
John J. Donahue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1147 (1998). Weisselberg summarizes the heart of this critique:
John Donahue has analyzed the Cassell and Fowles study closely. As
an initial matter, Donahue notes that FBI clearance data have proven
unreliable because, in addition to the manipulation of clearance rates
by local authorities, a perceived decline in clearance rates may reflect
nothing more than the improved reporting of crime.... Donahue also
doubts Cassell's and Fowles's conclusion that Miranda alone lies at
the root of any perceived drop in clearance rates in the late 1960s.
Cassell's regression analysis establishes only the significance of a
"post-1966" variable. The regression analysis itself does not identify
Miranda as the event that led to a perceived decline in clearance
rates within that time period. Further Miranda should not have a
substantial impact upon clearance rates because solving a crime
clears it whether or not an arrest or prosecution occurs, and Miranda
only operates after a suspect is in custody.... In the end, however,
Cassell provides the wrong answers to the wrong questions.
Weisselberg, supra, at 174-75.
12. When Miranda was decided, Philadelphia Police Commissioner Ed-
ward J. Bell decried the decision stating, "I do not believe the Constitution was
designed as a shield for criminals." LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND
POLITICS 176 (1983). Similarly, Boston Police Commissioner Edmund L.
McNamara complained, "Criminal trials no longer will be a search for truth,
but a search for technical error." Id.
13. Thus, in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the Court by a
bare majority rejected the dissent's contention that the defendant should have
the right to counsel during pre-trial interrogation so as to avoid the litigation
problems precipitated by pre-trial interrogation. Justice Douglas's dissent ex-
ADAPTING TO MIRANDA
provide "some automatic device by which the potential evils of
incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled." 14
The immediate reaction to Miranda was mixed. Critics
concerned with Miranda's effect on law enforcement main-
tained that the Court's novel interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment would significantly diminish the conviction rate
for serious crimes.' 5 Civil libertarians, on the other hand, ex-
pressed the view that Miranda did not provide adequate Fifth
Amendment protection to suspects because it "did not take the
final step of stating that the privilege against self-
incrimination cannot be fully assured unless a suspect's lawyer
is present during police station interrogation."16 In time, how-
ever, legal commentators came to view Miranda as a "compro-
mise" that would reasonably accommodate law enforcement in-
plained the basis for recognizing the suspect's right to counsel at this stage of
the proceedings: "The citizen who has been the victim of these secret inquisi-
tions has little chance to prove coercion. The mischief and abuse of the third
degree will continue as long as an accused can be denied the right to counsel
at this the most critical period of his ordeal." Id. at 444 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959), decided one year later,
four concurring Justices argued that a suspect who was formally charged with
a criminal offense should have a right to an attorney at pretrial questioning.
Moreover, other due process decisions decided during this era could be viewed
as imposing per se prohibitions on interrogation tactics designed to interfere
with the suspect's right to remain silent, see, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963) (finding defendant's confession involuntary primarily because
police told him he would be permitted to call his wife only after he confessed),
and thus as coming "closer and closer to Miranda's outcome." Catherine Han-
cock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2223 (1996).
14. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1977
SUP. CT. REV. 99, 103 (quoting WALTER SCHAFFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY
10 (1967)).
15. In his Miranda dissent, Justice White stated that there was:
every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who
otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has previ-
ously thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will now,
under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be tried at
all or will be acquitted if the State's evidence, minus the confession, is
put to the test of litigation.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (White, J., dissenting).
16. Eric Pace, Ruling on Police Hailed by A.C.L.U., N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
1966, at 25 (quoting statement of John de J. Pemberton, Jr., then the director
of the ACLU). Similarly, Aryeh Neier, the director of the ACLU's New York
chapter stated that Miranda "doesn't go far enough in protecting those who
most need protection. We do believe that a person must have the advice of
counsel in order to intelligently waive the assistance of counsel." YALE
KANMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFEssIONs: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
POLICY 47-49 & n.11 (1980).
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terests, while providing criminal suspects with additional Fifth
Amendment protection. 17
During the first few years after Miranda, empirical studies
suggested that Miranda's impact on law enforcement was
minimal.'8 Over the next two decades, few empirical studies
were conducted, and attacks on Miranda became muted. Al-
though there was some criticism from both the left 19 and the
right,20 the general consensus seemed to be that Miranda had
improved police practices-at least in the sense that interroga-
tors now afforded suspects a greater degree of dignity21-and
had had slight, if any, adverse effect on law enforcement.22
In the past decade, however, Professor Paul G. Cassell has
spearheaded a new assault on Miranda. Based on his reinter-
pretation of post-Miranda studies-most of which were con-
17. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Case, the Man and the Players, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1074, 1077 (1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 460-61 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Richard Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in
Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1967) (finding
that in one detective division within Allegheny County, after Miranda, sus-
pects' confession significantly declined, but the conviction rate remained about
the same); Michael Wald et al., Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1523 (1967) (concluding that Miranda handi-
capped police in New Haven, Connecticut, from obtaining a confession neces-
sary for conviction in only 6 of 127 cases); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Inter-
rogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda
on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 325 (1973) (con-
cluding that the post-Miranda "success" rate for police interrogations in a
California city declined only 2%). For a detailed discussion of these and other
studies, see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassess-
ment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 394-437 (1996); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 632-52 (1996); Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Van-
ishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516-47 (1996).
19. See supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV.
1417, 1419 (1985) (arguing Miranda has "accentuated... those features of our
system that manifest the least regard for truth-seeking"); Meese, supra note 5,
at 273 (characterizing Miranda as "truth-defeating").
21. See, e.g., CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 37 (1993) (observing that since Miranda "[tihe 'third
degree' seems to have largely disappeared from the American scene").
22. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 285-86 (1985); see also Jerold Israel, Criminal Procedure, the
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320,
1383 (1977) ("The police officers with whom I have spoken generally acknowl-
edge that announcement of the Miranda warnings causes little difficulty if the
warnings requirement is limited to interrogation of arrested persons at the
police station or in similar settings" (e.g., a patrol car)).
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ducted more than thirty years ago-Cassell asserts that the
existing empirical data support "the tentative estimate" that
Miranda has led to "lost cases" against 3.8% of all criminal
suspects, a figure that when "multiplied across the run of
criminal cases constitutes a large number of criminals."23 In
addition, based on a multiple regression time series analysis of
crime clearance rates before and after Miranda, Cassell and his
co-author Richard Fowles interpret the data as "suggest[ing]
that [violent] crime clearance rates would be 6.7% higher" if the
Court had not promulgated its Miranda decision in 1966.24
Based on these assessments, which have been disputed by
other commentators-most notably Professor Stephen J.
Schulhofer25-Cassell concludes that Miranda should be re-
placed by an alternative that imposes lesser costs on law en-
forcement while at the same time providing adequate Fifth
Amendment protection to criminal suspects.26
Assessing Miranda's costs to law enforcement is legitimate.
Post-Miranda decisions assert that the safeguards provided by
Miranda are not mandated by the Fifth Amendment privilege
but rather are designed to reduce the likelihood that police will
violate the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects subjected to
custodial interrogation. 27 Moreover, even Yale Kamisar, one of
23. Cassell, supra note 18, at 438.
24. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 11, at 1082.
25. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scape-
goat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
557 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified-and
Harmful, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347 (1997) [hereinafter Bashing
Miranda]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 278 (1996) [hereinafter Miranda and Clearance Rates]; Schulhofer, supra
note 17.
26. Cassell advocates that Miranda be replaced by safeguards under
which before engaging in custodial interrogation, the police would be required
to give a suspect five warnings and to tape the ensuing interrogation. See
Cassell, supra note 18, at 496-97. Significantly, the police would not be re-
quired to warn the suspect of his right to have an attorney present at ques-
tioning (apparently, the suspect would have no such right) and the police
would not be required to obtain a waiver of the suspect's rights before com-
mencing their interrogation. See id. at 497.
27. In post-Miranda cases, the Court has consistently referred to
Miranda's requirements as prophylactic safeguards designed to provide indi-
viduals with additional Fifth Amendment protection rather than as mandated
by the Fifth Amendment privilege. Thus, in New York v. Quarles, the Court
stated that "[tihe prophylactic Miranda warnings ... are 'not themselves pro-
tected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.'" 467 U.S. 649, 654
(1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)); see also Oregon
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Miranda's staunchest defenders, has conceded that the decision
was a "compromise,"28 designed to strike a proper balance be-
tween law enforcement and individual interests. In determin-
ing whether Miranda provides an appropriate compromise be-
tween these conflicting interests,2 9 empirical evidence relating
Miranda's costs to law enforcement or efficacy in protecting
suspects' rights should be taken into account.
In seeking to assess Miranda's costs to law enforcement,
however, Cassell consistently asks the wrong questions. Two
mistakes are particularly critical. First, instead of focusing on
Miranda's qualitative effects, including an assessment of its
impact on interrogators' interactions with suspects in a wide
range of situations, he seeks to assess Miranda's quantitative
effects, by trying to gauge Miranda's precise effect on the con-
fession rate, despite the absence of data necessary to engage in
this number-crunching exercise.30 Second, instead of focusing
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (referring to Miranda's requirements as
"prophylactic standards").
28. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice, in THE
WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 116, 120 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
29. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199
(1991) (observing that "if the... intent of the Miranda decision was, in fact,
an attempt to 'dispel the compelling atmosphere' of an interrogation, then it
failed miserably"); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 375, 385-86 (1997) (suggesting that Miranda may not provide individu-
als with significant protection against police pressure to incriminate them-
selves); see also Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 884 (concluding that Miranda is
"infinitely less candid than the due process balancing analysis" in that it fails
to fulfill its promise to provide individuals subjected to custodial interrogation
with significant protection against police pressure). But see Schulhofer, supra
note 18, at 562 (concluding that "confessions are now mostly the result of per-
suasion and the suspect's overconfidence, not of pressure and fear").
30. Cassell attempts to quantify Miranda's precise cost to law enforce-
ment in three steps: first, by attempting to measure the number of lost confes-
sions stemming from Miranda's warnings and waiver requirement; second, by
attempting to measure the percentage of cases in which a confession is neces-
sary for conviction; and, third, by multiplying these two figures to estimate the
number of lost convictions as a result of Miranda's warnings and waiver re-
quirement. See Cassell, supra note 18, at 437. Cassell's attempt at informed
quantification amounts to no more than elaborate speculation for at least
three reasons. First, the data is simply not adequate to the task: the Miranda
studies on which Cassell relies are well over three decades old and are replete
with methodological flaws. See Leo, supra note 18, at 646-48; Schulhofer, su-
pra note 18, at 506-07; George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda A Real-World Fail-
ure?: A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821,
823-31 (1996). Second, Cassell selectively counts those outdated and method-
ologically flawed studies supporting his argument to abolish Miranda, while
disregarding those studies that do not support his agenda. In his critique of
Casell, Professor Schulhofer observes that:
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on Miranda's effect on current interrogation practices and pre-
senting suspects' incriminating statements, Cassell directs his
attention primarily to the much less relevant question of
Miranda's effect on law enforcement in the past.31
Assessing Miranda's precise quantitative effect is impossi-
ble because of the Miranda studies' limitations. If Cassell's as-
sault on Miranda has served no other purpose, the debate pre-
cipitated by his assertions32 has clearly exposed severe
methodological deficiencies in the studies testing Miranda's ef-
fect on confessions and convictions.33 Even if all of the empiri-
at critical points in his analysis, data are cited selectively, sources are
quoted out of context, weak studies showing negative impacts are un-
critically accepted, and small methodological problems are invoked to
discredit a no-harm conclusion when the same difficulties are pres-
ent-to an even greater extent-in the negative-impact studies that
Cassell chooses to feature.
Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 502; see also George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk
About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions,
43 UCLA. L. REV. 933, 935-96 (1996) (concluding that Cassell's historical evi-
dence does not support the high pre-Miranda confession rate that he claims).
Third, even if confession rates have declined since Miranda, Cassell simplisti-
cally and incorrectly assumes he can isolate the precise causal impact of
Miranda from all the other competing factors-such as the complex social, po-
litical and legal changes that have occurred in the United States since the
mid-sixties-that might be responsible for such a change. Not surprisingly,
Professor Schulhofer, in a lengthy refutation of Cassell's attempt to measure
Miranda's costs, argues that Cassell's extrapolations are "simply rhetoric" and
"not a serious foundation for assessing social policy." Schulhofer, supra note
18, at 546. Elsewhere, Schulhofer has cautioned that, "[rieaders should un-
derstand that these are simply advocacy numbers, derived from indefensibly
selective accounts of the available data." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing in
the Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 21. Masquerading as
sound estimates of a real world phenomenon, Cassell's advocacy numbers are
little more than elaborate speculation.
31. Schulhofer makes a similar point, observing that "even if we can as-
sume that the studies give a reliable picture of Miranda's costs thirty years
ago, there is strong reason to believe that such costs were transitory and that
confession rates have since rebounded from any temporary decline." Schul-
hofer, supra note 18, at 506.
32. See Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda's Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996); Cassell & Fowles, supra
note 11; Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement:
Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 327 (1997); Cassell,
supra note 18; Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda, supra note 25; Schulhofer, supra
note 18; Thomas, supra note 30.
33. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 18, at 405 (criticizing "The 'Seaside City'
Study," which found only a 2% drop in the confession rate after Miranda, on
the ground that the study did not include "cases in which suspects were de-
tained for questioning but never incarcerated" and "did not give any informa-
tion on how the Seaside Police implemented Miranda"); Schulhofer, supra note
1999] 405
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cal studies were methodologically sound, they would not pro-
vide a firm basis for a long-term quantitative assessment of
Miranda's impact on law enforcement. Each study focuses on
Miranda's impact on a particular group of interrogators at a
particular time and place.34 At best, therefore, the studies pro-
vide information relating to the potential effect of Miranda on
law enforcement in discrete areas of the country during par-
ticular periods of time.35
Intuitively, it seems obvious that Miranda's effect on law
enforcement depends on various factors, including not only the
way in which interrogators implement Miranda-which is a
major focus of this Article-but also factors relating to the
crimes being investigated36 and the sophistication and back-
ground of suspects being interrogated. 37 Thus, a finding that a
18, at 516-17 (observing that with respect to the Pittsburgh study, which
found a substantial drop in the confession rate before and after Miranda, the
pre-Miranda confession rate was "based on the study author's count of usable
statements" whereas the post-Miranda confession rate for 1967 was "based on
new forms that police officers began completing immediately after interroga-
tions[;]" a difference that was likely to be important because there was no rea-
son "to assume that officers' on-the-spot judgments about what counted as a
usable statement" would be based on the same criteria as that employed by
the study author). For more general criticism of the early post-Miranda stud-
ies, see Leo, supra note 18, at 647 ("[W]ith one or two exceptions, these stud-
ies-virtually all of which were conducted by lawyers or law professors not
trained in the research methods of social science-are replete with methodo-
logical weaknesses[.]"); Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 506 ("Few, if any, in-
cluded all necessary segments of the caseload, used proper sampling proce-
dures, insured strict equivalence of the groups compared, and controlled for
relevant causal variables other than Miranda.").
34. See, e.g., Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 18, at 6 (examining Pitts-
burgh's detective branch files from 1964 through the summer of 1967 for cases
of homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, and auto larceny); Witt, supra note 18, at
322-23 (reviewing files from 1964 to 1968 dealing with murder, forcible rape,
robbery, and burglary, in "Seaside City," a Los Angeles area enclave with a
population of approximately 83,000).
35. Not surprisingly, post-Miranda studies conducted in different parts of
the country reached strikingly different conclusions as to Miranda's effect on
confessions. Compare Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation
in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1347, 1414 app. E tbl.E1 (1968) (finding a 3% drop in the statement rate after
Miranda) with Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 18, at 12 tbl.2 (showing a
16.9% drop in the confession rate after Miranda).
36. See Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 18, at 12 tbl.2 (showing that in
the Pittsburgh detective division the change in the confession rate before and
after Miranda varied from a slight increase in forcible sex crimes (20.4% to
21.4%) to a very significant decrease in robbery cases (61.2% to 28.9%)).
37. See SIMON, supra note 29, at 199 ("Repetition and familiarity with the
process soon place the professionals beyond the reach of a police interroga-
406 [Vol. 84:397
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particular Allegheny County detective division obtained 16.2%
fewer confessions during the six months after Miranda than it
did in the six months prior to Miranda38 may tell us something
about Miranda's impact on law enforcement in Allegheny
County during the latter half of 1966. 39 It tells us very little
about Miranda's immediate impact on interrogators operating
in other police departments in other parts of that state.
Moreover, it tells us almost nothing about Miranda's effect on
law enforcement in the United States as a whole at the end of
the twentieth century.
Indeed, Cassell's most glaring defect may be his failure to
take into account the ways in which interrogators have adapted
to the obstacles posed by Miranda over the past thirty-three
years. During that period, Miranda itself has changed. As a
result of the Burger and Rehnquist Court's post-Miranda deci-
sions, Miranda is no longer one case, but rather a body of safe-
guards that impose less strict safeguards than the original de-
cision. Moreover, as the obstacles posed to interrogators have
become less formidable, interrogators' strategies for sur-
mounting the remaining obstacles have grown more sophisti-
cated.
From the interrogator's perspective, Miranda's require-
ments are viewed as a stumbling block to conducting a success-
ful interrogation.40 The Miranda opinion's description of inter-
rogation techniques contained in police manuals 41 indicated
that long before Miranda, police interrogators had developed
sophisticated strategies for overcoming the obstacle of a sus-
pect's resistance to providing information to them.42 Since
tion."); see also Leo, supra note 18, at 654-55 (finding on the basis of a sample
of more than 170 interrogations that "a suspect with a felony record... was
almost four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect with no
prior record and almost three times as likely to invoke as a suspect with a
misdemeanor record").
38. See Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 18, at 12 tbl.2 (finding that the
overall confession rate fell from 48.5% to 32.3%).
39. During the same period, Seeburger and Wettick concluded that "before
compliance with the Miranda requirements the Detective Branch obtained
confessions in 54.4% of the cases and after compliance in only 37.5% of the
cases." Id. at 11. The authors also concluded that during this same period
"the conviction rate... remained steady." Id. at 19.
40. In an interview conducted by Leo, one detective said: "Miranda is a
stumbling block, it is a hurdle, and it is an important one. It is probably one of
the most crucial points in the interrogation." Leo, supra note 18, at 663.
41. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).
42. See, e.g., id. at 453-54 (outlining strategies employed when a suspect
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1966, the proliferation of new police manuals 43 discussing new
strategies for interrogators suggests that during the three dec-
ades following Miranda, interrogators have become even more
sophisticated in overcoming the obstacles to a successful inter-
rogation." Although the manuals do not directly address how
an interrogator might induce a suspect to waive his Miranda
rights,45 it would be counter-intuitive to believe that the police
have not developed strategies for circumventing this obstacle.46
Post-Miranda decisions help explain whether and to what
extent the police are able to implement such strategies. Most
importantly, post-Miranda decisions addressing the prerequi-
sites of a valid waiver provide at least the broad outlines of the
legal framework within which interrogators must operate when
trying to induce a suspect to waive his Miranda rights. In ad-
dition, post-Miranda decisions holding that statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda may properly be used for pur-
poses of impeachment are significant both because they bear on
the options available to the police when a suspect invokes his
Miranda rights47 and because they provide a snapshot of the
asserts her right to remain silent). Overcoming a suspect's resistance and
eliciting a confession were also the primary obstacles that police interrogators
confronted prior to Miranda.
43. See, e.g., ARTHUR S. AUBRY, JR. & RUDOLPH R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1980); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERRO-
GATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986); CHARLES E. O'HARA & GREGORY L.
O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (5th ed. 1981); ROBERT
F. ROYAL & STEVEN R. SCHUTr, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND
INTERROGATION: A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL AND GUIDE (1976); DAVID E.
ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW
AND INTERROGATION (1993).
44. See, e.g., AUBREY & CAPUTO, supra note 43, at 276-77 (asserting that
the interrogator should size-up the suspect before the interrogation to deter-
mine which of several interrogation techniques should be employed); ROYAL &
SCHUTT, supra note 43, at 61-62 (iterating various techniques that may be
used to develop rapport with the suspect prior to the interrogation; among
them, "[e]stablish confidence and friendliness by talking for a period about
everyday subjects"); ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 43, at 23 (explain-
ing the importance of taking on the role of the "mediator-negotiator" and con-
vincing the suspect that he can find "common ground" between the prosecution
and the suspect).
45. But see INBAU ET AL., supra note 43, at 234-36 (recommending that
interrogators establish consensual "non-custodial" interrogations to avoid the
necessity of Miranda warnings where possible); id. at 224-28 (advising inter-
rogators not to give premature or "extra" Miranda warnings, thereby mini-
mizing the possibility that suspects will assert their rights).
46. See supra text accompanying note 42.
47. See generally Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 135-36 (quoting from
training videotape advising interrogators as to when they may question "out-
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legal framework within which interrogators must operate when
the due process test, rather than Miranda, regulates their con-
duct.48
In Miranda, the Court indicated that it was adopting
stringent waiver requirements, which imposed a heavy burden
of proof on the government 49 and prohibited interrogators from
inducing a waiver through "tricke[ry]" or "cajole[ry] ."o5 Post-
Miranda decisions have been less strict, however, in mandating
specific requirements designed to ensure that suspects freely
waive their Miranda rights.5 1 To the extent these decisions
permit interrogators to employ new strategies designed to cir-
cumvent the protections provided by the Miranda warnings,
they have significantly affected Miranda's impact on interroga-
tors' interactions with suspects and, ultimately, Miranda's im-
pact on law enforcement.5 2
Miranda also seemed to indicate that statements obtained
in violation of Miranda would not be admissible for any pur-
pose.5 3 Post-Miranda cases have held, however, that state-
side Miranda" for the purpose of obtaining impeachment evidence).
48. There are other areas in which the due process test rather than
Miranda is applicable. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985)
(stating that fruits derived from a "noncoercive" Miranda violation will not be
excluded); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 n.7 (1984) (stating in dicta
that when Miranda's public safety exception applies, the due process volun-
tariness standard provides the test for determining the admissibility of a sus-
pect's statement). The impeachment cases are particularly significant, how-
ever, because they provide the police with a limited opportunity to circumvent
Miranda even in situations where a suspect invokes his Miranda rights. See
generally James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rules: Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1308 (1992)
(discussing impeachment cases dealing with the admissibility of evidence
when police continue to interrogate following a suspect's request for an attor-
ney).
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
50. Id.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 71-177.
52. Other decisions have also broadened interrogators' opportunities to
circumvent Miranda. For example, Miranda only applies to custodial interro-
gation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court
narrowed the definition of custody, holding that a suspect is in custody when
his "freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'"
468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam)). Berkemer's holding, of course, opens up the possibility
that, so long as they do not effect an arrest, the police may conduct lengthy
"interviews" with suspects without giving suspects Miranda warnings. See
generally Kate Greenwood & Jeffrey A. Brown, Investigation and Police Prac-
tices: Custodial Interrogations, 86 GEO. L.J. 1318 (1998).
53. Miranda states:
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ments obtained in violation of Miranda may be admissible for
the purposes of impeaching a defendant's credibility in the
event that he testifies on his own behalf.5 4 In addition, other
post-Miranda cases have held that evidence derived from
statements obtained in violation of Miranda-including not
only testimony from other witnesses, 5 but also physical evi-
dence 56 and statements obtained from the suspect himself57-
may be admissible in the government's case-in-chief. Based on
these cases, interrogators dealing with suspects who have as-
serted their Miranda rights still have at least a limited oppor-
tunity to circumvent Miranda. When seeking statements that
will be admissible for the purposes of impeachment, or that
they hope will lead to other incriminating evidence, interroga-
tors may employ any interrogation tactics not prohibited by the
due process voluntariness test.58
The extent to which police circumvent Miranda in order to
obtain impeachment or derivative evidence is not clear. Cas-
sell's empirical study of interrogations in Salt Lake City, Utah
during the summer of 1994 suggested that this tactic was
rarely employed.5 9 On the other hand, Professor Charles Weis-
statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate un-
truths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477
54. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). In addition, other post-Miranda decisions held that
evidence derived from statements obtained in violation of Miranda would be
admissible so long as the evidence was not the product of a due process viola-
tion. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 441 (1974).
55. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450-51.
56. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 302, 307.
57. See id. at 308.
58. The due process voluntariness test prohibits the introduction of con-
fessions determined to be involuntary based on an evaluation of the circum-
stances of the interrogation and the individual characteristics of the suspect
subjected to interrogation. For post-Miranda cases applying the due process
voluntariness test, see, for example, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-
88 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-70 (1986). See generally
Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
2001, 2014-20 (1998) (discussing post-Miranda due process voluntariness
cases).
59. Of the 129 cases in which Cassell and Hayman gathered data, they
report that in none of the interviews did the police continue questioning after
a subject invoked Miranda rights. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Po-
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selberg's more recent examination of interrogation practices in-
dicated that at least in California,60 training for interrogators
includes specific advice as to how they may question a suspect
who invokes his right to an attorney in order to obtain state-
ments that will be admissible for the purposes of impeach-
ment,61 a tactic that is referred to as questioning "outside
Miranda."62 Data relating to questioning "outside Miranda"
provides some basis for determining the types of situations in
which the abolition of Miranda would likely make a differ-
ence.63 Cases in which police are able to persuade suspects to
give statements that are inadmissible under Miranda but ad-
missible for the purpose of impeaching the suspect provide a
good indication of the types of cases in which abolishing
Miranda would enable interrogators to obtain additional
statements for use in the government's case-in-chief.6"
lice Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda,
43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860-61 (1996). Since Cassell and Hayman did not ob-
serve the police interviews, however, they had to rely on information related to
them by the police. See id. at 861 n.123. In Leo's observation of 175 cases, in-
terrogators continued questioning 7 of the 38 suspects who invoked their
Miranda rights. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J.
CRII. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996).
60. In assessing how often interrogators intentionally circumvent
Miranda in order to obtain statements that are admissible for impeachment
purposes, Weisselberg observes that in California "training materials" in-
structing interrogators how to accomplish this goal were "distributed state-
wide." Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 136. He thus concludes that "[t]here can
be no doubt that the practice... has spread throughout California." Id.
61. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, app. at 189-92 (citing an excerpt of
transcript of training video advising interrogators as to when and how they
should question suspects "outside Miranda").
62. See id. at 133.
63. If, as expected, the Supreme Court accepts certiorari in U.S. v. Dicker-
son, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) a real possibility exists that the Court would
hold that the congressional statute replacing Miranda makes Miranda inap-
plicable in federal cases. Although predicting results in Supreme Court cases
is always hazardous, the Court now contains a solid core of conservatives that
might be inclined to defer to legislation replacing Miranda's "prophylactic"
rules. Moreover, if the Court were to rule in favor of the government in Dick-
erson, this might at least be the beginning of the end for Miranda, since state
legislatures would then also be free to pass statutes replacing Miranda with
the voluntariness test.
64. Specifically, the extent to which questioning "outside Miranda" pro-
duces statements admissible for impeachment from suspects who responded to
the Miranda warnings by invoking their right to remain silent or to have an
attorney present at questioning provides a good indication of the extent to
which abolishing Miranda would allow the government to obtain additional
statements for use in its case-in-chief. When interrogators obtain statements
admissible for impeachment from suspects who were not adequately warned of
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In this Article, we will consider some of the ways in which
the interplay between the post-Miranda Court's interpretation
of Miranda and modem police officers' interrogation strategies
have affected Miranda's impact on law enforcement. Unlike
Cassell, we will not attempt to provide a quantitative assess-
ment of Miranda's past or present impact. Rather, drawing
from numerous interrogation transcripts collected over the past
twelve years, 65 we will explain modern interrogators' most im-
portant strategies for dealing with Miranda and consider
Miranda's current effect on law enforcement in light of these
strategies.
In our view, the picture that emerges is far more ambigu-
ous and complex than Cassell-or his chief antagonist, Schul-
hofer-would have it. Miranda does have some impact on law
enforcement. Determining the magnitude of its impact or the
categories of cases in which it is most likely to make a differ-
ence, however, depends on imponderables, including untested
assumptions relating to suspects' behaviors and speculation
concerning the constitutional principles that would replace
Miranda. At the very least, these conclusions suggest that our
response to Miranda should be nuanced rather than sweeping.
In presenting the doctrine and data relevant to the ways in
which modem interrogators' adaptation to Miranda has af-
fected Miranda's impact on law enforcement, we begin in Part
II by examining the post-Miranda waiver doctrine and assess-
ing the extent to which the Supreme Court or lower courts have
provided a legal framework that allows the police to employ
strategies designed to induce waivers of Miranda rights. Spe-
cifically, this Part considers legal restrictions imposed on inter-
rogators' efforts to elicit Miranda waivers by either de-
emphasizing the significance of the Miranda rights or offering
express or implied inducements that increase the likelihood of a
waiver. Although Supreme Court doctrine relating to these is-
sues is unclear, lower courts have generally interpreted that
their Miranda rights in the first place, assessing the extent to which abolish-
ing Miranda would enhance the availability of statements admissible in the
government's case-in-chief is more speculative because it is difficult to deter-
mine the extent to which these suspects would have made incriminating
statements if they had been given the Miranda warnings.
65. The excerpts from interrogation transcripts discussed in this Article
are taken from interrogation transcripts collected by Richard Leo and Richard
Ofshe from cases in various jurisdictions dating from 1987 to the present. See
Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 981 n.1 (1997).
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doctrine so as to provide interrogators with considerable lee-
way. Since interrogators, like other police officers, are likely to
interpret unclear legal restrictions in a way that is most favor-
able to law enforcement,66 the waiver doctrine's practical effect
is to impose relatively few restrictions on interrogators' em-
ployment of strategies designed to induce a suspect's waiver of
his Miranda rights.
Part III considers the strategies currently employed by in-
terrogators to induce Miranda waivers. Based on an examina-
tion of numerous interrogations conducted in a wide variety of
settings, this Part concludes that interrogators employ a range
of sophisticated strategies to induce waivers. In particular, in-
terrogators are able to de-emphasize the warnings to such an
extent that suspects often perceive that waiver of their rights is
the natural and expected course of action.67 Indeed, interroga-
tors are sometimes able to present the Miranda warnings so
that suspects are led to believe that waiving their Miranda
rights will be to their advantage.68
Part IV examines post-Miranda cases that allow the gov-
ernment to impeach a defendant's testimony through the use of
evidence obtained through questioning a suspect "outside
Miranda." Under these cases, the due process voluntariness
test provides the standard for determining the admissibility of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.6 9 As interpreted
by the lower courts, the due process test allows the police to
employ a wide range of tactics in questioning suspects "outside
Miranda."
Part V considers strategies employed by interrogators
questioning suspects "outside Miranda." In comparison to the
empirical evidence relating to strategies employed to induce
Miranda waivers, data relating to questioning "outside
Miranda" is sparse. The existing data indicates, however, that
interrogators questioning "outside Miranda" employ strategies
66. Justice Jackson's statement as to how the police will interpret and ap-
ply exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment has gen-
eral application: "[T]he extent of any privilege... which we sustain, the offi-
cers interpret and apply themselves and ... push to the limit." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. See infra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 197-214 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 231-47 and accompanying text.
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that are extremely likely to produce incriminating state-
ments.7
0
Drawing from the data presented in the previous parts,
Part VI briefly assesses the effect that abolishing Miranda
might have on law enforcement and suspects' rights. After ex-
plaining the most likely changes in both interrogation practices
and the law regulating such practices, Part VI seeks to identify
the categories of cases in which the abolition of Miranda would
most likely enable interrogators to obtain additional admissible
incriminating statements.
Finally, Part VII discusses the Article's principal conclu-
sions. In assessing Miranda's effect, either on law enforcement
or custodial suspects, it is vitally important to consider the
various ways in which interrogators have adapted to Miranda.
As we will show in this Article, police interrogators have re-
fined their interrogation techniques so that, despite the obsta-
cles posed by Miranda, they are able to obtain admissible
statements. This data should be taken into account in deter-
mining Miranda's future.
II. POST-MIRANDA WAIVER DOCTRINE
Post-Miranda cases have diluted the Miranda court's
waiver requirements, thereby diminishing the legal barriers
that might restrict interrogators from using tactics designed to
induce Miranda waivers. In assessing the difference between
Miranda's waiver requirements and those in effect now, it is
useful to consider post-Miranda decisions' effects on waiver re-
quirements in three discrete areas: (1) the extent to which the
suspect has to understand the meaning of the Miranda warn-
ings; (2) restrictions imposed on police efforts to induce a
waiver before or at the time the warnings are given; and (3) re-
strictions imposed on police efforts to induce a waiver after the
suspect has been given the warnings and invokes either his
right to remain silent or his right to counsel.
A. THE SUSPECT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE MIRANDA
WARNINGS
In Miranda itself, the Court equated the Miranda waiver
standard with the waiver of the right to trial counsel articu-
lated in Johnson v. Zerbst:71 in order to meet that standard,
70. See infra notes 296-307 and accompanying text.
71. 304 U.S. 458, 462-69 (1938).
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the government would have to surmount the "heavy burden" of
demonstrating that the suspect "knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel."72 By equating the standards of
waiver applied in Miranda with those applied when the right to
trial counsel is at issue, the Court seemed to indicate that a
Miranda waiver could only be found when the suspect was
shown to be fully aware of the consequences of foregoing his
rights.73 Under this standard, interrogation strategies de-
signed to de-emphasize the significance of the Miranda warn-
ings would be suspect. An intelligent waiver would presumably
require a full understanding of the consequences of relin-
quishing one's rights to remain silent and to have counsel pres-
ent at questioning.74
Post-Miranda cases have significantly modified the defini-
tion of an intelligent Miranda waiver, however. In order to es-
tablish such a waiver, the government needs only to demon-
strate that the suspect understood the meaning of the Miranda
warnings, not that he understood the consequences of waiving
his rights. 75 Specifically, based on the Court's holding in Colo-
rado v. Spring, a suspect may validly waive his Miranda rights
even though he is not aware of the magnitude of the charges
against him at the time of his waiver.76 And, based on the
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
73. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (stating that
in order to waive representation by counsel at trial, a defendant must be
"made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"); Carn-
ley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (holding that in order to establish a
valid waiver of trial counsel, there must be proof that "an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer").
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sites, 235 A.2d 387, 390 (Pa. 1967) (stat-
ing in dicta that a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights "does not
occur unless there is full knowledge of the rights one is forfeiting").
75. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987); Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1986).
76. 479 U.S. at 576-77. In Spring, the defendant was arrested on a fire-
arms charge. See id. at 566. After being given Miranda warnings, he waived
his rights. See id. at 567. The arresting officers questioned the defendant not
only about the firearms charge, but also about a murder. See id. During this
questioning, the defendant made an incriminating statement about the mur-
der. See id. Later, he tried to suppress this statement and a confession
stemming from it on the theory that his Miranda waiver was invalid because
at the time of the waiver he was not aware of its consequences in that he did
not understand the extent of the questioning he would be subjected to. See id.
at 569. The Court rejected this argument, finding that once Miranda warn-
ings are properly administered and understood, a suspect has all the informa-
tion he needs to make a valid waiver. See id. at 576-77. Any "additional in-
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Court's holding in Moran v. Burbine, a suspect may waive his
Miranda rights (including the right to have an attorney present
at questioning) even though he is unaware that a lawyer has
been retained to represent him.77
Based on these cases, the assumption seems to be that
reading Miranda warnings to a suspect will generally insure
that he has sufficient understanding of the warnings to make a
valid waiver.78 North Carolina v. Butler,79 another post-
Miranda case, establishes, moreover, that a suspect's waiver of
his Miranda warnings need not be express, but can be implied
from the circumstances.80 Under Butler, interrogators may ob-
tain a valid Miranda waiver even though the suspect never
makes an express written or oral statement that he wishes to
waive his rights. After the interrogator informs the suspect of
his Miranda rights, the suspect may validly waive his rights by
formation could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially
voluntary and knowing nature." Id. at 577.
77. 475 U.S. at 422-23. In Burbine, the defendant was arrested and taken
to police headquarters where an officer advised him of his Miranda rights. See
id. at 416. Unknown to the defendant, the defendant's sister had secured an
attorney, who attempted to reach the defendant, but was rebuffed by the po-
lice. See id. at 416-17. That evening, the defendant signed a form waiving his
Miranda rights and confessed to the murder. See id. at 415, 417-18. The de-
fendant sought to exclude his confession on the grounds that the police refusal
to allow his attorney to contact him compromised his waiver. See id. at 418.
In holding the defendant's waiver valid, the Court observed that as long as the
defendant could fully comprehend his Miranda rights, outside events of which
he had no knowledge (in this case, the attorney's attempt to contact him) could
have no bearing on his decision to waive. See id. at 422.
78. An exception may apply when the suspect is so mentally handicapped
that he lacks the capacity to understand the meaning of the Miranda warn-
ings. In practice, however, courts have generally held that a suspect's mental
capacity is only one of many factors to be considered when determining the
validity of a waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307, 1312
(11th Cir. 1990) ("[Mlental illness is only a factor to be weighed in determining
the validity of a waiver."); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 398-99 (11th Cir.
1988) (finding suspect's waiver valid despite evidence of mental retardation).
79. 441 U.S. 369 (1979), vacating 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
80. In Butler, the defendant was questioned by FBI agents in connection
with an armed robbery and shooting. See id. at 370. The agents read the de-
fendant his Miranda rights and gave him a waiver form to sign. See id. at
371. The defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights and said he
would speak to the agents; at the same time, however, he refused to sign the
waiver form. See id. The defendant then made incriminating statements. See
id. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that his Miranda waiver
was per se invalid because he did not sign the waiver form. See id. at 373.
The Court concluded that, despite the lack of an express written statement of
waiver, "[uin at least some cases waiver can clearly be inferred from the ac-
tions and words of the person interrogated." Id.
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simply indicating that he is willing to speak with the interroga-
tor.8
1
The post-Miranda cases thus provide a doctrinal frame-
work within which interrogators seeking a Miranda waiver
have ample opportunity to de-emphasize the significance of
both the Miranda warnings and the suspect's decision to waive
such warnings. Although the Miranda opinion seemed to imply
otherwise,82 interrogators operating within this framework
have no obligation to ensure that the suspect understands the
significance of his choice to relinquish his rights.
B. RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON POLICE EFFORTS To INDUCE A
WAIVER PRIOR TO OR CONCOMITANT WITH THE WARNINGS
In Miranda itself, the Court appeared to impose severe re-
strictions on interrogators' efforts to induce a waiver prior to
informing a suspect of his Miranda rights. In the context of
delineating strict waiver requirements, the Court stated that
"any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or ca-
joled into a waiver" would vitiate the waiver.8 3 Under the most
common definition of cajolery,84 this language would seem to
prohibit the police from exerting any kind of pressure, includ-
ing persuasion, that would lead the suspect to waive his rights.
Thus, the police would be required to give the warnings in a
neutral manner and not use any inducements that might have
the effect of precipitating a waiver.
While post-Miranda cases have not repudiated this lan-
guage,8 5 in both Spring and Burbine, the Court emphasized
8L See United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding a valid waiver where a suspect responded to a police request to waive
his rights by asking to speak confidentially to a detective); Stawicki v. Israel,
778 F.2d 380, 381-84 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding a valid waiver where a suspect
refused to agree to waiver, but requested to speak to a detective).
82. See supra text accompanying note 49.
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
84. "Cajole" is defined as "to persuade with deliberate flattery, esp. in the
face of reasonable objection or reluctance." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 313 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 1981).
85. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1987), the Court quoted
Miranda's "trickery" language, but refused to interpret it to apply to an inter-
rogator's failure to inform a suspect that he would be questioned about a crime
unrelated to the crime for which he had been arrested. Similarly, in Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986), the Court referred to the "trickery" lan-
guage, but found that the police behavior-warning the suspect of his right to
have an attorney present at questioning without informing him that his attor-
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that in determining the validity of a Miranda waiver, the criti-
cal issue is whether the waiver is voluntary and intelligent.86
Although Spring and Burbine did not address whether the po-
lice could affirmatively misrepresent information that might
have a bearing on the suspect's waiver decision, 87 the Court's
articulation of the voluntary waiver standard seemed to sug-
gest that interrogators' use of inducements to precipitate waiv-
ers does not necessarily render the resulting waivers invalid.
Rather, as other cases have stated, a waiver's validity will be
determined by a "totality of circumstances" test that depends
on an evaluation of all factors relating to the waiver's volun-
tariness. 88
In practice, this totality of circumstances test provides
fewer restrictions on the police than Miranda's dicta appeared
to contemplate. 89 In applying this test, lower courts typically
state that the factors to be considered include "the accused's
characteristics, the conditions of interrogation, and the conduct
of law enforcement officials." 90 As lower courts have noted,91
the "totality of circumstances" test closely resembles the due
process test under which the voluntariness of a suspect's con-
fession is determined by evaluating the same factors, among
others.92 Providing guidance for police officers under either of
ney was attempting to contact him-while ethically questionable, did not vio-
late Miranda.
86. See Spring, 479 U.S. at 573 (citing Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421).
87. In Spring, the Court left open the question of whether a waiver pre-
cipitated by an interrogator's affirmative misrepresentation would be valid.
See id. at 576 n.8.
88. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986); Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); cf Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 108 (1975)
(White, J., concurring), affd, 254 N.W.2d 29 (Mich. 1977) (arguing that, even
after a suspect initially asserts his right to remain silent, voluntariness is the
appropriate standard for determining the validity of a Miranda waiver).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1995) (per
curiam); Commonwealth v. Williams, 640 A.2d 1251, 1259 (Pa. 1994).
90. United States v. Lynch, 92 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also State v. Knight,
459 S.E.2d 481, 493 (N.C. 1995) ("Some of the factors to be considered include
i) whether the defendant was in custody, (ii) defendant's mental capacity,
(iii) the physical environment of the interrogation, and (iv) the manner of the
interrogation.").
91. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D. 1994) (applying
due process voluntariness test to determine the validity of a Miranda waiver).
But see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Magee, 668 N.E.2d 339, 344 (Mass. 1996)
("Due process requires a separate inquiry into the voluntariness of the state-
ment, apart from the validity of the Miranda waiver.").
92. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963) (considering
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these "totality" tests is obviously problematic because neither
test is designed to impose specific restrictions on the police. 93
Since inducements that render a waiver (or a confession) invol-
untary in one context may be permissible in another,9 4 a court
determining the validity of a waiver cannot focus simply on the
nature of the police inducement but must assess all of the rele-
vant factors. 95
In general, more recent cases indicate that the police are
afforded considerable freedom to obtain Miranda waivers
through the use of inducements. During the past decade, no
court has held that the police are absolutely prohibited from
using any persuasion to induce a Miranda waiver.96 Moreover,
while there is no consensus as to the types of inducements that
are permissible, lower courts have generally imposed rather
permissive limits, providing interrogators with considerable
freedom to employ tactics designed to induce a waiver.
A few courts, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,97
have found Miranda waivers invalid when police induced sus-
pects to believe that they would receive leniency if they agreed
as factors a sixteen-hour long questioning, a five to seven day incommunicado
detention, and a police refusal to allow the defendant to phone his wife); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1959) (considering as factors the defen-
dant's low level of education, an eight-hour overnight uninterrupted interroga-
tion session, and trickery employed by the police).
93. For a discussion of the limitations of both tests, see Mark Berger,
Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and
the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1012-21
(1988). For criticism of the due process voluntariness test on the grounds that
it failed to provide adequate standards for the police or courts, see, for exam-
ple, Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the
Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745-55 (1987);
Stone, supra note 14, at 101-06. For a discussion of the shortcomings of any
test that focuses on determining voluntariness, see George C. Thomas III,
Miranda: The Crime, the Man, and the Law of Confessions, in THE MIRANDA
DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 7, 18 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas III eds., 1998) (concluding that this is "sometimes a philosophical or
psychological problem of the first magnitude").
94. See infra text accompanying notes 101-33.
95. See, e.g., Anderson, 929 F.2d at 99.
96. No cases after 1990 yielded such holding based on federal law. Search
of WESTLAW, Allfeds Library (Oct. 25, 1999).
97. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 553 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. 1989), affd, 626
A.2d 133 (Pa. 1993) (holding Miranda waiver induced by police promise to in-
form prosecutor of suspect's cooperation invalid because "[piromises of benefits
or special considerations ... comprise the sort of persuasion and trickery
which easily can mislead suspects into giving confessions"); Commonwealth v.




to talk with their interrogators.9 8 Most courts have held, how-
ever, that even inducements that include express or implicit
promises of leniency will not necessarily be sufficient to vitiate
the waiver.9 9 On the other hand, courts are more likely to hold
Miranda waivers invalid if they were induced through affirma-
tive misrepresentations or misleading statements.100 Even in
these cases, however, courts have been reluctant to hold that
an interrogator's misrepresentation automatically renders a
suspect's Miranda waiver involuntary. As under the due proc-
ess voluntariness test, the ultimate question of a waiver's va-
lidity depends on an assessment of all of the relevant circum-
stances.
Two cases from the Second Circuit illustrate the parame-
ters within which most lower courts operate in making the
waiver determination. In United States v. Anderson,01 a DEA
agent arrested the defendant and advised him of his Miranda
rights. 0 2 The defendant responded that he understood his
rights. 10 3 The agent then asked the defendant if he wanted a
lawyer present before answering questions. 0 4 The defendant
98. See Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 416 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding
waiver invalid because of police admonition that it "might be worse" if suspect
didn't cooperate); United States v. Pinto, 671 F. Supp. 41, 60 (D. Me. 1987)(holding that a police promise to keep the suspect out of jail if he cooperated
vitiated the suspect's Miranda waiver).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1990). In
Rutledge, a suspect accused of drug possession waived his Miranda rights af-
ter he was told that "all cooperation is helpful." Id. at 1128. He subsequently
confessed to dealing a substantially larger amount of drugs than the police
had originally suspected, which resulted in a sentence several times longer
than the one he would have received if he had not confessed. See id. The
court held that the "cooperation" statement made by the police did not invali-
date the suspect's Miranda waiver: "Far from making the police a fiduciary of
the suspect, the law permits the police to pressure and cajole, conceal material
facts and actively mislead" within certain limits. Id. at 1131; see also United
States v. Bye, 919 F.2d 6, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1990) (advising a suspect that coopera-
tion may be rewarded with leniency does not per se invalidate a suspect's
waiver of his Miranda rights); United States v. Ingalls, 982 F. Supp. 315, 317
(D. Vt. 1997) ("Promises of leniency, without more, do not invalidate a
Miranda waiver.").
100. See Anderson, 929 F.2d at 100; United States v. Morgan, 911 F. Supp.
1340, 1350-51 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding waiver invalid when postal inspector
told suspect that he would not be permitted to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege at trial).
101. 929 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1991).





responded that he did not need one.105 Inexplicably, the agent
then told the defendant that if he asked for an attorney, no fed-
eral agents would be able to speak to him further.1°6 The agent
added,
[TIhis [is] the time to talk to us, because once you tell us you want an
attorney we're not able to talk to you and as far as I [am] concerned,
we probably would not go to the U.S. Attorney or anyone else to tell
them how much [you] cooperated with us.'0
The agent repeated this point three more times. After that, the
defendant made several incriminating statements.108
The district court held that the defendant's waiver was in-
voluntary because the agent's statements "were intended to
trick and cajole the defendant into confessing." 0 9 The Second
Circuit rejected this conclusion, stating that police "[tirickery
does not make it impossible per se to find that a defendant vol-
untarily waived his rights."110 The court added that the ques-
tion to be determined is whether, based on the factors consid-
ered under the "totality of circumstances" test, "the defendant's
will was overborne by the agent's conduct.""' Thus, the court
indicated that, if the defendant was "knowledgeable about
Miranda waivers,"11 2 police trickery, would not be likely to ren-
der his waiver involuntary.
On the facts presented in Anderson, however, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the defendant's
waiver and confession were involuntary. 113 The court found
that the agent's assertions relating to the loss of any opportu-
nity to cooperate with the government were false and mislead-
ing because "[it is commonplace for defendants who have ac-
quired counsel to meet with federal law enforcement officials









113. Although the district court found that the defendant's Miranda waiver
was involuntary, the circuit court primarily addressed the question of whether
the defendant's confession was voluntary. See id. at 98. Due to the way in
which it framed the issue, however, the Second Circuit seemed to view these
questions as essentially the same. See id. at 98-102.
114. Id. at 100.
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guished Burbine on the ground that in the present case, the
police induced the defendant's waiver through the use of af-
firmative misrepresentation.1 15 Applying the totality of cir-
cumstances test, the Second Circuit concluded that both the de-
fendant's Miranda waiver and his confession were
involuntary."16
In United States v. Lynch, 117 ATF agents arrested the de-
fendant for a drug offense, read him the Miranda warnings,
and transported him to ATF headquarters where he met with
an agent who was responsible for "processing"' 18 him. During
this procedure, the defendant was constantly asking questions
and making statements about the case. 119 In response, the
agent informed the suspect of his Miranda rights, 120 and then
told him that if he wished to make any more statements or
have his questions answered, he would have to sign a form in-
dicating that he chose to waive his Miranda rights. 121 The de-
fendant read the form, signed it, and thereafter made incrimi-
nating statements. 122
The district court held that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.123 Applying the totality
of circumstances test, the Second Circuit affirmed.124 The court
concluded that the agent's suggestion that the defendant would
have to waive his Miranda rights if he wanted to continue his
conversation with the agent was not coercive. 125 The court dis-
tinguished Anderson on the ground that the ATF agent's
statement to the defendant did not constitute an affirmative
misrepresentation. 126 The agent "did not present the same type
of ultimatum that was presented to the defendant in Ander-
115. See id. at 100-01.
116. See id. at 102.
117. 92 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1996).
118. Id. at 64 (describing the steps of processing as "taking his fingerprints,
advising him of his constitutional rights, and completing a pedigree form").
119. See id.
120. The agent asked the defendant to read his Miranda rights from an
ATF form. See id. After doing so, the defendant, at the agent's request,
signed a statement on the form indicating that he had read his rights. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 65.
124. See id.
125. In applying the totality of circumstances test, the court also relied on
the defendant's circumstances and actions, including the fact that the defen-
dant chose to answer some questions and not others. See id.
126. See id. at 65-66.
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son."127 The ATF agent's statement merely indicated that if the
defendant wanted the agent to answer his questions "at that
moment," he would have to sign the waiver form. 128 In contrast
to Anderson, the ATF agent did not indicate that the defen-
dant's failure to sign the form would "'forfeit forever' any future
opportunity to have his questions answered by government offi-
cials."129 Thus, under the circumstances presented, the agent's
inducement was not coercive and did not render the defendant's
Miranda waiver involuntary.130 The court added, however,
that under other circumstances, an agent's refusal to answer
questions posed by a criminal suspect may "be misleading as
well as coercive." 131 The court emphasized that in this case, the
agent was merely responding to the defendant's questions by
telling him that he could not answer his questions relating to
his criminal case in the absence of a waiver.132
As these cases indicate, application of the totality of cir-
cumstances test to determine the validity of a Miranda waiver
provides only minimal restrictions on the types of inducements
interrogators may use to obtain a waiver. Even when the in-
ducements are viewed as coercive (i.e., likely to precipitate an
involuntary waiver), their use in a particular case may be per-
missible because, based on the totality of circumstances, the co-
ercive tactic did not overbear the suspect's will. Moreover, in
determining whether a particular inducement is coercive, nu-
ances in the facts may be critical. For instance, whether the
police have affirmatively misrepresented information to the
suspect may turn on such fine distinctions as whether an
agent's inducement seems to pertain only to the present (i.e.,
an opportunity to talk to this officer at this time) or to stretch
into the future so that it becomes an ultimatum (i.e., one's only
opportunity to talk to the government about this offense).
From the police perspective, this state of the law suggests
several conclusions. First, interrogators may properly use a
wide array of inducements to obtain a Miranda waiver. Sec-
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id.




132. See id. The court also observed that the agent was not trying to pres-
sure the defendant into a waiver but was responding to the situation precipi-
tated by the defendant's questions. See id.
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ond, even when the interrogation tactics employed to induce a
waiver are close to the line of impropriety, it will be difficult to
predict whether a particular inducement will have the effect of
invalidating a Miranda waiver. Finally, in close cases, where
the tactics employed are close to the line, subtle nuances in the
facts, which may arise due to slight variations in an officer's
testimony,133 are likely to determine the outcome.
C. RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON POLICE EFFORTS To INDUCE A
WAIVER AFTER A SUSPECT INVOKES HIS RIGHTS
In Miranda, the Court seemed to indicate that a suspect's
assertion of his right to remain silent or to have an attorney
present at questioning must end an interrogator's attempt to
question a suspect outside the presence of counsel. According
to Miranda, once the suspect invokes his right to remain silent,
"the interrogation must cease."134 And when the suspect in-
vokes his right to have an attorney present, "the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present."135
Post-Miranda cases have held, however, that a suspect's
invocation of his right to remain silent or his right to an attor-
ney does not necessarily preclude the police from obtaining a
waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights. 136 These cases have
distinguished situations in which the suspect invokes his right
to remain silent from those in which he invokes his right to ob-
133. As Justice Harlan observed in his dissent, Miranda does little to alle-
viate one of the principal problems with incommunicado interrogation-re-
solving conflicts between the interrogating officers' and suspects' versions of
the facts relating to critical issues. Just as the determination of whether a
suspect's confession was voluntary within the meaning of the due process test
often used to depend on the resolution of a swearing contest relating to what
happened during the interrogation, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the validity of a suspect's waiver now often de-
pends on the resolution of a swearing contest relating to the events surround-
ing the reading of the Miranda rights. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Su-
preme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 808-09 (1970). When suspects and police officers differ as to critical facts,
moreover, judges are likely to resolve the credibility dispute in favor of the of-
ficers. See id. For example, Professor Kamisar found in Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977), that when the interrogating detective contradicted the
suspect's version of the facts, the detective invariably won the swearing con-
test, but when the detective disputed the defense counsel's testimony, the at-
torney rather than the detective was found to be credible. See KAAIISAR, supra
note 16, at 130.
134. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
135. Id.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 138-77.
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tain an attorney, making it somewhat more difficult to obtain a
waiver in the latter situation. 137 In both situations, however,
post-Miranda cases provide interrogators with some elbow
room within which they can seek to obtain waivers through the
use of inducements.
Michigan v. Mosley 138 dealt with a situation in which a
suspect responded to the Miranda warnings by invoking his
right to remain silent, but two hours later, he was given new
Miranda warnings, after which he waived his rights and then
was interrogated. These second Miranda warnings were given
at a different location by a different officer who was ostensibly
investigating a different crime. 139 The Mosley majority estab-
lished the rule that when a suspect responds to the Miranda
warnings by invoking his right to remain silent, the police are
required to scrupulously honor the suspect's invocation of his
rights. 140 Concurring in Mosley, Justice White maintained that
the test in this situation should be simply whether the sus-
pect's waiver of his rights was knowing, intelligent and volun-
tary, the same test that applies when the suspect does not ini-
tially invoke his right to remain silent.141 By rejecting Justice
White's test, the Mosley majority "made it clear that the re-
quirement that the police 'scrupulously honor' the suspect's as-
sertion of his right to remain silent is independent of the re-
quirement that any waiver be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary."42
Nevertheless, in practice, the difference between Mosley's
"scrupulously honor" test and the "knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary" test advocated by Justice White appears to be
minimal. In Mosley itself, the Court held that the "scrupu-
lously honor" test was met.143 In justifying this result, the
Court at one point stated that Mosley was not a case in which
"the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to
cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the inter-
rogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to
137. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
138. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
139. For an excellent examination of the Mosley case, see Stone, supra note
14, at 129-37.
140. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
141. See id. at 107-08 (White, J., concurring).
142. Stone, supra note 14, at 133.
143. See id. at 135.
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make him change his mind."144 Relying on this language, some
lower courts have held that the "scrupulously honor" test only
bars the police from persistent attempts to induce a waiver, 145
an approach that is only marginally different from the volun-
tary waiver test advocated by Justice White. 46 Other lower
courts have interpreted Mosley as providing a balancing test,
under which various factors must be considered in determining
whether the individual's rights have been "scrupulously hon-
ored."147 Even under this test, however, interrogators will have
considerable opportunity to obtain waivers from suspects who
invoke their rights to remain silent, so long as they remain pa-
tient and adopt a flexible approach.148
When a suspect responds to the Miranda warnings by in-
voking his right to have an attorney present at interrogation,
the test for waiver is stricter. In Edwards v. Arizona, 49 the
Court held that a suspect who invokes this right "is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities" unless he "initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
144. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06.
145. See United States v. McClinton, 982 F.2d 278, 282 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding that when a different set of officers interrogated the suspect after he
had invoked his right to remain silent, the "scrupulously honor" test was met
because the police did not persist in efforts to induce a waiver); Nelson v. Ful-
comer, 911 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1990) ("This is not a case ... where the po-
lice failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, ei-
ther by refusing to discontinue an interrogation upon request or by persisting
in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his
mind." (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06)).
146. See Stone, supra note 14, at 135.
147. See United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410-12 (9th Cir. 1988); Jack-
son v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel.
Balderas v. Godinez, 890 F. Supp. 732, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Wilson v. United
States, 444 A.2d 25, 29 (D.C. 1982).
148. In Hsu, the court held that the police "scrupulously honor[ed]" the
suspect's right to cut off questioning even though the same officer questioned
him shortly after he asserted his right to remain silent. Hsu, 852 F.2d at 410-
12. The court based its holding on the officer's deferential treatment of the
suspect and the fact that the officer re-advised the suspect of his Miranda
rights prior to the second interrogation and the physical setting had changed.
See id. at 411-12. In explaining Mosley's test, the court said that "[flar from
laying down inflexible constraints on police questioning and individual choice,
Mosley envisioned an inquiry into all of the relevant facts to determine
whether the suspect's rights have been respected." Id. at 410. In Jackson, the
court held that the police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's assertion of his
right to remain silent even though, following his assertion of that right, the
police approached him and attempted to obtain a waiver of his Miranda rights
five times in six hours. Jackson, 837 F.2d at 1471.
149. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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police."' 50 Based on this test, Edwards does provide protection
for the suspect who invokes his right to an attorney 151 and then
refrains from participating in any further interactions with the
police. If the suspect initiates further exchanges with the po-
lice, however, the Edwards protection no longer applies.
In practice, the Edwards exception for the situation in
which the suspect "initiates" further exchanges with the police
has proven to be significant. First, the Court interpreted the
term "initiates" broadly. In Oregon v. Bradshaw,152 a pivotal
plurality of the Court 153 concluded that "initiation" occurs
whenever a suspect's question or statement to the police can
reasonably be interpreted by the police as "evinc[ing] a willing-
ness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the inves-
tigation."154 Under this interpretation, Edwards' protection
may be lost whenever a suspect says anything that could be
construed by the police as pertaining to the charges against
him.155
150. Id. at 484-85.
151. In order to trigger this protection, however, the suspect's invocation of
his right to counsel must be unambiguous. See Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See infra notes 215-30 and ac-
companying text for further discussion of Davis's impact on the strategy em-
ployed by interrogators when a suspect invokes his right to have an attorney
present.
152. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
153. In Bradshaw, the suspect was arrested for furnishing liquor to a mi-
nor. See id. at 1041. He was also suspected of driving the truck that caused
the minor's death. See id. An officer gave the suspect Miranda warnings and
then suggested that he had been behind the wheel of the truck when the acci-
dent occurred. See id. The suspect asserted his right to an attorney and the
officer immediately terminated the conversation. See id. at 1041-42. A few
minutes later, the suspect said to the officer, "Well, what is going to happen to
me now?" Id. at 1042. The Court split 4-4 as to whether the suspect's ques-
tion, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" constituted "initiation" of ex-
changes or communications within the meaning of Edwards. See id. at 1045,
1055. Speaking for four Justices, Justice Rehnquist concluded that it was "ini-
tiation" because "[allthough ambiguous, the [suspect's] question... evinced a
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation."
Id. at 1045-46 (plurality opinion). Although not agreeing that a suspect's
waiver of his Miranda rights should depend on whether he "initiated" further
exchanges with the police, Justice Powell joined the Rehnquist plurality in
concluding that the suspect in this case validly waived his Miranda rights.
See id. at 1051 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). See Kamisar, supra note
28, at 124 for criticism of the way the Court applied Edwards "initiation" test
in Bradshaw.
154. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46.
155. See supra note 153.
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Moreover, Edwards' prohibition on interrogation does not
prevent the police from subtly persuading the suspect that it
may be in his interest to revoke his assertion of his right to an
attorney and waive his rights. If such persuasion is successful,
the suspect will then "initiate" further conversations with the
police as a prelude to a valid waiver. So long as the police per-
suasion does not amount to interrogation, the police's interac-
tions with the suspect will not constitute a violation of Ed-
wards.156
Commonwealth v. D'Entremont, decided by the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court, provides an apt illustration of a case in
which an interrogator's subtle persuasion was found to be per-
missible under Edwards. 57 In D'Entremont, the police ar-
rested the seventeen year-old defendant for assault and rape. 158
When they read him his Miranda warnings, he invoked both
his right to remain silent and his right to have an attorney pre-
sent.159 The police then placed him in a cell at the police sta-
tion.160 Later that day, his father visited him at the police sta-
tion and told him not to discuss the facts of the case until he
spoke with an attorney.' 61
At 6:00 p.m., about four hours after the defendant's arrest,
Detective Terrio went to the defendant's cell. 162 She introduced
herself to the defendant and informed him that she had inter-
viewed the victim and obtained her story of what had hap-
pened. 16 3 She then told the defendant that she knew he had
advised the police that he did not wish to discuss the facts of
156. However, Edwards may be read as holding that once the suspect in-
vokes his right to have an attorney present, the police are prohibited not only
from interrogating the suspect but from attempting to induce a waiver. In
Edwards, Justice White stated that the government could not establish a sus-
pect's waiver by showing that "he responded to further police-initiated custo-
dial interrogation." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). This lan-
guage could be read to mean that once the suspect invokes his right to an
attorney the police are prohibited from obtaining "a police-initiated waiver."
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
other words, unless the suspect "initiates" further exchanges with the police,
the police are prohibited from "initiating" communications that might lead the
suspect to reconsider her decision to assert her rights.
157. 632 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Mass. 1994).








the case with them, but, if he changed his mind, she would be
willing to speak with him.164 The defendant told Terrio that he
wanted to tell her his side of the story.165 After receiving an-
other set of Miranda warnings, the defendant waived his rights
and made an incriminating statement.166
The court held that Detective Terrio did not violate Ed-
wards because her comments did not constitute interroga-
tion. 167 Under the Court's decision in Rhode Island v. Innis,168
interrogation occurs only when the police engage in the "func-
tional equivalent" of express questioning-that is, words or ac-
tions that the police "should have known... were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response." 169 The court held
that Terrio's remarks did not meet this test because they did
not imply a question or demand a response. 70 Rather, they
merely constituted "an expression of her availability if [the de-
fendant] wanted to talk."171 Thus, even though her comments
obviously "struck a responsive chord," 172 they did not constitute
interrogation. 173
D'Entremont's analysis shows that certain effective forms
of persuasion may be permissible despite the suspect's invoca-
tion of his rights. Detective Terrio did "scrupulously honor" the
defendant's assertion of his rights, because she informed him
that she knew he had invoked his rights and indicated that she
would not seek a statement unless he changed his mind.
Moreover, although the question whether Terrio's statements
to the defendant constituted "interrogation" is undoubtedly a
closer one, 174 the court's analysis is supportable. The detective
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1240-41. At Terrio's urging, the defendant talked to his fa-
ther by telephone from her office before waiving his rights. See id. at 1240.
Although his father reiterated that the defendant should not talk to the police
about the case without having a lawyer present, the defendant persisted in his
decision to waive his rights. See id. at 1241.
167. The court also held that Terrio did not violate Mosley's "scrupulously
honor" test because the defendant was not interrogated before he gave a
statement. See id. at 1241 n.3.
168. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
169. D'Entremont, 632 N.E.2d at 1242 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 1242-43.
172. Id. at 1242 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301).
173. See id. at 1243.
174. The test for whether an officer's statement constitutes interrogation is
whether it is one that the officer "should know [is] reasonably likely to elicit an
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merely told the defendant that she had taken the victim's
statement and would be available to take his statement in the
event that he changed his mind and decided to talk to the po-
lice. Ostensibly, her words were neutral, and the court could
properly find that it was not the functional equivalent of inter-
rogation because it neither demanded nor invited a response. 175
In fact, however, Terrio's remarks constituted a powerful
inducement that led the defendant to revoke his right to have
an attorney present. The inducement occurred as soon as Ter-
rio stated that she had interviewed the victim. That statement
could lead the suspect to believe that Terrio might be in a posi-
tion to make important decisions relating to his case. To
strengthen the inducement, moreover, Detective Terrio em-
ployed a variation of the reverse psychology described by Mark
Twain in The Adventures of Tom Sawyer.176 By suggesting that
she was not interested in obtaining a statement but was simply
offering the defendant an opportunity to give her one, the de-
tective was able to make the option of giving a statement seem
attractive. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that
incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Moreover,
the Court added "where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating
response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one
which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect."
Id. at 301-02 n.7. Arguably, Detective Terrio's statement to the suspect was
designed for no other purpose than to lead the suspect to waive his right to
have an attorney present and to tell his story to the detective. On the other
hand, if Edwards holds that the police are prohibited from "initiating" com-
munications relating to the waiver decision with a suspect who has asserted
her right to counsel, then Detective Terrio's statement to the suspect would
appear to constitute improper "initiation." See supra note 150 and accompa-
nying text.
175. For discussions of what constitutes interrogation within the meaning
of Miranda, see Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:
What is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 101 (1978), re-
printed in KAMISAR, supra note 16; Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without
Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 1209, 1251 (1980).
176. As punishment for playing hooky, Tom Sawyer's Aunt Polly ordered
him to whitewash her fence. Tom, however, conned his playmates into doing
the job for him by convincing them that whitewashing the fence was a desir-
able activity rather than a chore. He accomplished this by pretending that he
enjoyed the activity so much that he would not allow his friends to do any of
the whitewashing for him. See MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF TOM
SAWYER 30-33 (1875). As the author explained, "Tom... had discovered a
great law of human action, without knowing it-namely, that in order to make
a man or a boy covet a thing, it is only necessary to make the thing difficult to
attain." Id. at 33.I
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the suspect decided to revoke his earlier decision and waive his
rights so that he could make a statement to the detective.
The D'Entremont case is not necessarily typical. Indeed,
there are few reported cases in which interrogators employ
stratagems to induce a waiver after the suspect has invoked ei-
ther his right to remain silent or his right to have an attorney
present at questioning. 7 7 Nevertheless, the court's holding in-
dicates that, even when a suspect invokes either or both of
these rights, interrogators operating within the boundaries of
what is legally permissible may employ a substantial range of
stratagems to induce Miranda waivers.
III. STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY INTERROGATORS TO
INDUCE MIRANDA WAIVERS
Although reported cases dealing with interrogators' tech-
niques for obtaining Miranda waivers provide the legal frame-
work within which interrogators must operate, these cases do
not necessarily provide a good picture of the strategies actually
employed by interrogators. First, the police interpret and apply
cases in light of their particular concerns. In some instances,
this may lead the police to interpret Miranda strictly, in order
to ensure that incriminating statements obtained by interroga-
tors will be admissible.' 78 In other instances, the police may in-
terpret the post-Miranda cases so as to maximize the abilities
of interrogators to obtain admissible incriminating statements.
In determining whether incriminating statements are likely to
be admissible, moreover, the police may take into account two
factors favoring admissibility: first, lower courts (especially
trial courts) are likely to interpret post-Miranda doctrine in a
way that is favorable to the police; 179 second, at least in cases
where the interrogation is not recorded or otherwise tran-
scribed, interrogating officers' testimony relating to the
177. See, e.g., Shedelbower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 1989).
After the defendant in Shedelbower asked for an attorney, the interrogating
detectives prepared to leave the room. See id. at 572. As they were leaving,
one of the detectives falsely told the defendant that the victim had positively
identified him as her assailant. See id. In response, the defendant waived his
right to counsel and confessed. See id. The court held that the defendant's
waiver was proper because the detective's false statement to the defendant did
not constitute interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. See id. at 573.
178. See Leo, supra note 18, at 645.
179. See Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 806-08.
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Miranda waiver is likely to minimize facts that would tend to
support the suspect's claim of an invalid waiver.180
In order to obtain a more accurate picture of interrogators'
practices, we will draw on our own examination of recent inter-
rogations, 181 focusing especially on the ways in which interro-
gators deliver the Miranda warnings and the tactics they em-
ploy to obtain Miranda waivers.
Empirical data indicates that the police deliver the
Miranda warnings in at least three ways. First, the police may
deliver the warnings in a neutral manner; second, they may de-
emphasize the warnings' significance by delivering them in a
manner that is designed to obscure the adversarial relationship
between the interrogator and the suspect; and, third, they may
deliver the warnings in a way that communicates to the suspect
that waiving his rights will result in some immediate or future
benefit for him. While most of the interrogation strategies
seem to fall within at least one of these three categories, de-
termining whether an interrogator is merely de-emphasizing
the warnings' significance or also offering a benefit in exchange
for waiving them is not always easy. Moreover, when dealing
with a suspect who invokes either his right to remain silent or
his right to an attorney, interrogators will sometimes employ
additional strategies in order to induce the suspect to change
his mind.
A. DELIVERING MIRANDA WARNINGS IN A NEUTRAL MANNER
Interrogators are sometimes advised that a safe way to
elicit a Miranda waiver and to avoid a legal challenge to that
waiver is to deliver the Miranda warnings in as simple a man-
ner as possible.'8 2 The most direct way to execute this advice is
to read the warnings from the standard preprinted Miranda
form cards, even before engaging in any conversation with the
180. Thus, in advocating that the police be required to record interroga-
tions when feasible, Kamisar observes:
[ilt is not because a police officer is more dishonest than the rest of us
that we should demand an objective recordation of the critical events.
Rather, it is because we are entitled to assume that he is no less hu-
man-no less inclined to reconstruct and interpret past events in a
light most favorable to himself-that we should not permit him to be
"a judge of his own cause."
KAMISAR, supra note 16, at 137 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Ju-
dicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 242 (1950)).
181. See supra note 65.
182. See Leo, supra note 18, at 659.
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suspect. To the extent that interrogators follow this practice,
they are acting merely as conveyors of legal information, deliv-
ering the warnings in a way that appears non-partisan. The
interrogator does not seek to persuade the suspect to waive
Miranda, or to suggest that some benefit might follow from
such a waiver. Instead, the interrogator merely delivers the
Miranda warnings without any apparent strategy, as if he is
indifferent to the suspect's response. 18 3 After reading the
warnings, such an interrogator typically asks two questions:
whether the suspect understands his rights and whether he
wishes to waive them. If the suspect answers yes to both ques-
tions, he has waived his Miranda rights.184
B. DE-EMPHASIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MIRANDA
WARNINGS
Perhaps the most common strategy employed by interroga-
tors seeking Miranda waivers is to de-emphasize the signifi-
cance of the required warnings. Interrogators employing this
strategy typically engage in rapport-building small talk with
their suspects before mentioning the Miranda warnings. In or-
der to de-emphasize the significance of the Miranda warnings,
the interrogator then portrays the reading of the warnings as
an unimportant bureaucratic ritual and communicates, implic-
itly or explicitly, that he anticipates that the suspect will waive
his rights and make a statement.
Interrogators may attempt to de-emphasize the Miranda
warnings in several ways. One strategy is to camouflage the
warnings by blending them into the conversation. Detectives
who employ this approach often become less animated when
they read the warnings. Thus, some detectives deliver the
Miranda warnings in a perfunctory tone of voice and bureau-
cratic manner, implicitly suggesting that the warnings do not
merit the suspect's concern or that his passive acceptance of
them is a foregone conclusion. Other detectives read the
warnings without pausing or looking up at the suspect, some-
times even a little quickly, before requesting the suspect's sig-
183. "One might associate this style with the television character Joe Fri-
day in the popular 1960s television show 'Dragnet.'" Id. at 660.
184. After receiving affirmative answers to the two questions, interrogators
will typically ask for and receive the suspect's signed statement that he is
waiving his Miranda rights. But see North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369
(1979) (holding that a suspect's Miranda waiver may be valid even though he
declines to give a written statement).
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nature on the waiver form, all the while implying that the
warnings are merely a matter of routine that necessarily pre-
cedes any questioning.
Another way to de-emphasize the Miranda warnings is to
explicitly call attention to the formality of the warnings, sug-
gesting that they are unimportant. An interrogator employing
this strategy typically tells the suspect that the Miranda
warnings are a mere formality that they need to dispense with







Okay, let.., let me go ahead and do this here real
quick, like I said so don't let this ruffle your feathers or
anything like that it's just a formality that we have to
go through, okay. As I said this is a Miranda warning
and what it says is that you have the right to remain
silent, anything you say can be used against you in a
court of law, you have the right to the presence of an
attorney to assist you prior to questioning and to be
with you during questioning if you so desire, and if you
cannot afford an attorney you have the right to have
an attorney appointed for you prior to questioning. Do
you understand these?
Yeah.
Okay. Any questions about those at all?
(shakes head side to side)
Okay. Now as I've said, uh... our main objective is to
try and get some answers for.., for things that...
that we're looking into. Uh... what we try to do as
I've said before is... is go to people that can... can
help us and that and lead us in a direction, okay, oth-
erwise we'll roll around aimlessly and uh... end up
talking to people that.., that don't make any differ-
ence, okay. We know that you probably, most defi-
nitely have some information that can help us out in
this regard. That's why I want to talk to you, okay?
Do you know what I'm talking about?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrogator: Okay; so do you know what I want to talk to you about?
Suspect: (shakes head up and down)'
Interrogators may also de-emphasize the significance of the
Miranda warnings by referring to their dissemination in
popular American television shows and cinema, perhaps joking
that the suspect is already well aware of his rights and proba-
185. Interrogation Transcript of Dante Parker, Maricopa County Sheriffs
Office, Ariz. 1-2 (Sept. 12, 1991) (on file with authors).
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bly can recite them from memory. Before giving the Miranda
warnings in one interrogation, for example, the interrogating
detective said to the suspect, "you've probably seen it on TV a
thousand times. I know I've said it about ten thousand
times.' 86 In another interrogation, the interrogating detective
developed this same theme as follows:
Interrogator: ... before we talk to anybody about anything, there's a
thing called Miranda and I don't know if you've heard
about it, if you've seen it on TV, urn... the... just to
cover ourselves and to cover you, to protect you, we
need to, to advise you of your Miranda rights and we
need to know that you understand 'em. and that you
can hear them, so if you'll speak up for us, okay? Jeff.
Suspect: Yeah.'1
By referring to the dissemination of Miranda warnings in
American popular culture, interrogators seek to trivialize the
warnings' legal significance. Their hope is that the suspect will
not come to see the Miranda warning and waiver requirements
as a crucial transition point in the questioning or as an oppor-
tunity to terminate the interrogation, but as equivalent to other
standard bureaucratic forms that one signs without reading or
giving much thought.188
One of the most powerful de-emphasizing strategies in-
volves focusing the suspect's attention on the importance of
telling his story to the interrogator. 8 9 The interrogators com-
municate to the suspect that they want to hear his side of the
story,190 but that they will not be able to do so until the suspect
186. Interrogation Transcript of McConnell Adams, supra note 1, at 15.
187. Interrogation Transcript of Lewis Peoples, Stockton Police Dep't, Cal.
4-5 (Nov. 12, 1997) (on file with authors).
188. Indeed, sometimes the interrogator explicitly indicates that the
warnings are a formality that the suspect should get out of the way by signing
the waiver card. In one case, for example, the interrogator stated:
In order for me to talk to you specifically about the injury with [vic-
tim's name], I need to advise you of your rights. It's a formality. I'm
sure you've watched television with the cop shows, right, and you
hear them say their rights and so you can probably recite this better
than I can, but it's something I need to do and we can [get] this out of
the way before we talk about what's happened.
Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence
Game, 30 LAW & SOCY REV. 259, 272 (1996).
189. "The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect's interest to talk
with police will forever be the catalyst in any criminal interrogation." SIMON,
supra note 29, at 201.
190. A standard such refrain goes as follows:
Listen, Joe, I talked to the witnesses and they all say you're involved
in this thing. But before I file any charges, I'd like to get your side of
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waives his Miranda rights. An interrogator employing this
strategy will typically begin with some discussion of the case
against the suspect:
Interrogator: ... Okay, urn, I don't know as to what degree involve-
ment that you're in on this thing, okay? But I would
like to hear your side of the story. Everybody's got a
story to tell. Because you're in custody, I know urn,
Detective Lucas, he read you your rights once already,
right? Urn, before I can hear anything, you, I have to
read you your rights just like he did. Did you under-
stand them when he read them to you?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrogator: Okay, it's just like T.V. But I can't talk to you unless I
read them to you."9 '
When effectively employed, this strategy will often have
the effect of totally undermining the Miranda warnings' effect.
As in the following example, the suspect becomes so eager to
tell his side of the story that he views the warnings as a need-
less impediment to his goal:
Interrogator: I don't think this woman was telling us the whole
truth. Okay. I think that it's not, probably not as sig-
nificant as she's letting on at this point. Okay. So this
is why you're here. Now I'd like to talk to you about
what this woman is saying, we've more or less ah, you
know, if we just talk to her and she alleges this felony









And I know there's more to it and I know, I know you
were there. That's not a problem because, because we
have, that, that ain't no big deal. But I also need to
know the real truth because I'm not sure she's telling
us the whole story.
What, what is she trying to say?
Well, she's alleging that you pointed the gun at her.
Uh-huh (negative). Nah-uh.
(Unintelligible). Alright before we, before we do that,
I, like I said I know there's more to this story than
she's telling us. But-
the story. I want to hear you tell me what you did-and what you
didn't do. But first, I gotta read you your rights. You watch TV, you
know the drill ....
Peter Carlson, The Seduction: Cops, Suspects and the New Art of Interroga-
tion, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 13, 1998, at 11.
191. Interrogation Transcript of Michael Johnson, Solano County Sheriffs
Dep't, Cal. 2-3 (Apr. 26-27, 1992) (on file with authors).
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Suspect: I don't even know her, you know what I'm saying (un-
intelligible)-
Interrogator: Whoa, whoa, whoa. I can't take your statement until
we get through that Miranda issue.
Suspect: Oh.
Interrogator: You can't tell me anything until we get through that.'
In some cases, the strategy employed in the last two exam-
ples not only de-emphasizes the significance of the Miranda
warnings but also communicates to the suspect that he will re-
ceive a benefit in exchange for waiving his rights. If the inter-
rogator leads the suspect to believe that telling his side of the
story may be to his advantage, then the line between simply de-
emphasizing the warnings' significance and offering a benefit
in exchange for their waiver is crossed. As in the last example,
it is often difficult to determine whether the interrogator has
crossed that line. 193 As the next section will show, however, in-
terrogators sometimes employ this strategy so as to make it
clear to the suspect that waiving his Miranda rights will be to
his advantage.
Another way interrogators de-emphasize the significance of
the Miranda warnings is to treat the suspect's waiver of the
warnings as a fait accompli, a decision that not only is expected
but also requires no participation from the suspect. Interroga-
tors employ this strategy through reading the suspect the
Miranda warnings and then moving directly into the interroga-
tion without asking the suspect for an explicit waiver of the
Miranda rights:
Interrogator: Okay. You can call me Mark, all right, if you want?
What I want to do is ask you some questions, all right?
And I want to get your side of the story. And you're
right, maybe you never could do something like this.
But since you've been handcuffed and all that stuff,
I've got to read you your rights. Have you ever had
them read to you before?
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator: Yeah? You have the right to remain silent. You do not
have to talk to me or answer any questions. You have
192. Interrogation Transcript of Kentrick McCoy, Sacramento Police Dep't,
Cal. 14-15 (Sept. 1, 1996), quoted in Ofshe & Leo, supra note 65, at 1002-03.
193. The officer's statement that "if we just talk to her and she alleges this
felony crime occurred, then we're more or less obligated to make an arrest"
might suggest to the suspect that if he provides the police with a scenario in-
volving less culpability on his part (i.e., showing-as the police believe-that
the incident was less "significant") the police will not be obligated to make a
felony arrest. Id. at 14.
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the right to have an attorney and have an attorney
present during questioning if you wish. If you cannot
afford to hire one, one will be appointed to represent
you free of charge. Do you understand those rights?
Suspect: (Nodding head. Inaudible).'9
Following this exchange, the detective immediately launched
into the interrogation without first asking the suspect whether
he wished to waive his rights or even whether he was willing to
speak to the police.195
Still another approach to de-emphasizing the Miranda
warnings is to create the appearance of a non-adversarial rela-
tionship between the interrogator and the suspect. An interro-
gator employing this strategy portrays himself as the suspect's
friend, confidant or guardian, whose goal is not to obtain in-
criminating statements but rather to help the suspect improve
his situation. If the interrogator personalizes the interaction
and convinces the suspect that he is trustworthy, the suspect
will almost inevitably view the Miranda warnings as insignifi-
cant. The following example illustrates the tactics that may be
employed to establish the interrogator's non-adversarial role:
Interrog 1: I consider myself to be a friend of yours.
Suspect: Yeah, you're a friend of mine, Bill, all right.
Interrog 1: We've had hot fudge sundaes together, and we've ex-
changed Christmas letters and-we've done various
things like that.
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrog 1: So I guess we, we just need to kind of cut to the, the
whole thing and let me lay it out for you a little bit,
about some of the reports that we've had. You lived
in-did you live in the dorms of Triangle X, or where
was it you lived there?
Suspect: Oh, I lived in the dorms, the-
Interrog 1: Okay. And at that time your job was managing the
wrangling for the ranch?
Suspect: Yeah.
194. Interrogation Transcript of Jason Young, San Pablo/Richmond Police
Dep't, Cal. 4-5 (June 21, 1997) (on file with authors).
195. Sometimes detectives modify the traditional phrasing of "Having
these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?" to "Having these rights in
mind, do you want to hear what I have to say?" or "Having these rights in
mind, do you want to tell me your side of the story?" See Leo, supra note 18, at
664.
438 [Vol. 84:397
19991 ADAPTING TO MIRANDA
Interrog 1: We've had any number of reports from girls, who now
are 21 years, 22, 23, 24 years old, about you taking
some liberties with them at the ranch when you were
working there. And these are not, you know, these are
not just really young girls. These are, these are kids
now who are 21, 22, and these things took place 10 to
15 years ago.
Suspect: Huh.
Interrog 1: So we really need-we need to get to the bottom of it.
We've got a problem that we've got to work out. Be-
cause there's just too many, too many reports that
have come in.
Suspect: Okay.
Interrog 1: Now, what I want to do, before we get too deep into
this, is to advise you of your rights. I think you have,
you have the right to be advised. So I'll advise you of
your rights. Do you have a card with you?
Interrog 2: Yes, I do.
Interrog 1: I left mine at home. You have the right to remain si-
lent. Anything you say can or will be used against you
in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a law-
yer and have him present with you while you are being
questioned. If you can't afford to hire a lawyer, one
will be appointed to represent you before any ques-
tioning, if you wish. And you can decide at any time to
exercise these rights and not answer any questions
when you're making your statement. Do you under-
stand what the rights are[?]
Suspect: Yeah.' 96
Assuming a non-adversarial role not only de-emphasizes
the Miranda warnings but also may suggest to the suspect that
waiving his Miranda warnings will be to his advantage. Once
the interrogator suggests to the suspect that she is his friend or
that she is there to help him, further statements relating to
solving a problem or working things out may communicate to
the suspect that statements he makes to the interrogator, who
is his friend rather than his adversary, will be used to alleviate
his difficulty. Thus, in most cases, interrogators who employ
this strategy are offering suspects benefits in exchange for
Miranda waivers, as well as de-emphasizing the Miranda
warnings' significance.
196. Interrogation of Russell Stone, Salt Lake City Police Dep't, Utah 2-4
(Dec. 5, 1995) (on file with authors).
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C. OFFERING SUSPECTS BENEFITS IN EXCHANGE FOR MIRANDA
WAIVERS
Interrogators may seek to persuade a suspect that waiving
his Miranda rights will be in his best interest and will result in
tangible or intangible benefits. Interrogators pursuing this
goal will employ various strategies. Sometimes the interroga-
tor will explicitly tell the suspect that waiver of his rights is the
only way he can obtain a tangible benefit. The interrogator
may state, for example, that she can only inform the suspect of
the charges against him and the likely disposition of his case if
the suspect waives his Miranda rights; she may state that she
can only portray the suspect's account in its most favorable
light to the prosecutor if the suspect waives his rights; she may
explain that the charges against the suspect will be reduced if
the suspect gives some explanation for what he has done; or she
may simply assert either that the suspect will be in greater
jeopardy if he does not waive Miranda, or that he will receive
more lenient treatment if he does.
In many cases, however, the benefit offered in exchange for
a Miranda waiver will be implicit rather than explicit. Con-
sider, for example, the case of Alan Adams. In the pre-waiver
portion of Adams's interrogation, detectives confronted Adams
with what they wanted him to believe was overwhelming evi-
dence of his guilt:
Interrogator: ... Your arrest has come about after, uh, well, actu-
ally, well over a thousand man hours of investiga-
tion....
... We have the physical evidence, uh, from the scene.
And, uh, what we'd like to do right now is give you the
opportunity just to explain why it happened ....
... [Wle've talked to, uh, numerous people. People
who you apparently thought you could confide in, urn,
and the opposite is true .... 19
After Adams denied committing the offense, the interrogators
used a common post-waiver interrogation technique, telling the
suspect that the purpose of questioning was not to discuss
whether, but why, he committed the offense:198
Suspect: Well, I can't give you any answers because I didn't do
it.
197. Interrogation Transcript of Alan Adams, Sonoma County Sheriffs Of-
fice, Cal. 1 (July 4, 1991) (on file with authors).
198. For a fuller explanation of this interrogation strategy, see Ofshe &
Leo, supra note 65, at 1006.
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Interrogator: Well, it's not a matter of you not or, doing it or not. We
know you did it, okay. And we're...19
After reasserting that the evidence against Adams was
conclusive, the interrogator then suggested that Adams' situa-
tion might be improved if he spoke to the police and offered an
explanation for his actions. The interrogator implied that if
Adams told his side of the story, he would not be viewed by the
system as a maniacal killer-an outcome that would carry the
stiffest of all possible sentences. Instead, he would be viewed
more favorably and in the end receive more lenient punishment
from the system if he spoke with the police:
Interrogator: ... [Tihere's been a, a one-sided story that's been told
right now, of a, of a, a maniacal killer that had no rea-
son that, that wasn't pushed into doing something.
And I don't know if that's the case or not. Maybe it is
the case, but maybe it's not. Maybe there's something
more. Maybe there's an explanation, eh, we all do
things for reasons and you're not any different from
anybody else. You have reasons. I have reasons for
what I do. I've done things in my past that I'm not
proud of. But you know what? I've had more control to
control myself from doing things like this. You're no
dif, any different from anybody else when you think
about things like this. The difference is in you is that
you acted out on your thoughts and that's the differ-
ence and that's why you're under arrest today and
that's why you and I are, and, and Detective Doherty
are here today. It's because you went a step further
than everybody else. And I suppose that you would
want to change it but you're not gonna change it, Alan.
That's not gonna happen. It's something that has to be
dealt with. We're willing to hear your side of the story
on that. Because I think that you do have a side. Do
you see what I'm saying?...
Interrogator: [The scene is making it look like this is a, a, a mania-
cal, evil person. Is that what you are?
Suspect: No.
Interrogator: Well, that's what I'm saying. That those are the sym,
assumptions that a person has to draw. You, you saw
what she saw. And so you think about it. What goes
through our mind when we're, we were in it for over
fifty hours processing the scene and collecting minute,
physical microscopic evidence. Do you see what I'm
saying? We were there. What would the scene tell you
199. Interrogation Transcript of Alan Adams, supra note 197, at 2.
200. Id. at 5.
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had you not been there? Huh? You have to under-
stand what we're thinking here, okay? And we're
willing to hear your side of the story. We are willing to
hear your side of the story. You have a side of the
story. Okay? Your friends that you talked to ... you
can only take friendship so far but when you start
trusting people with secrets like this, they have an ob-
ligation they how, they have an obligation to do the
right thing. Because you didn't do the right thing.
And yes, they informed us. Okay? And based upon
their information, we collected physical evidence and
we established proof.
Suspect: My friends informed you?
Interrogator: Yes.
20 1
By suggesting that Adams may have made a mistake
(rather than being a "maniacal killer"), the interrogators held
out to Adams the possibility that he might receive a lesser
punishment if he could provide some explanation for his acts
rather than letting them look like the conduct of a maniacal or
purposeful killer:
Interrogator: When we make mistakes, it's time to do, it's time to
make things right (inaudible). Maybe you made a big
mistake. Maybe you don't even consider it a mistake.
I don't know. Maybe this isn't to you a mistake. I don't
know.




... And, and maybe what you did with Anthony caused
this to occur. So like I say, I want to talk to you about
this physical evidence that, uh, we're getting and we
can talk more, you know? If you want to talk more
about the other things and.., and, uh... we, we, we
are fair people and we're gonna be very fair with you.
And I, I would appreciate the same respect that we're
giving you. Um, we, we would like to remain very pro-
fessional about this. Do you understand?
Um-hmm. I understand.
Okay. So I want to talk to you about this physical evi-
dence here and get your insight into it. And what I
really hope that you'll want to talk to me about is the
whys, okay? And maybe, uh, Alan Hill's a good, a good
place to start. I don't know. Anthony. It may be a
very good place to start with the whys. But before we
do all this I want, I, you've probably seen this on T.V.
and I'm going to do this for you too. And I don't know if
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id. at 8.
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your rights have ever been read to you, but I'm going to
explain them to you. Okay? I know that you, you
probably already know you have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against
you in a Court of Law. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer and have him present with you while you're
being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer,
one will be appointed free of charge to represent you
before and during any questioning if you so desire. Do
you understand all of those rights?
Suspect: Yeah.20
3
The interrogators then questioned Adams without explicitly
asking whether he wanted to continue the discussion and even-
tually obtained a confession.
As the Adams case demonstrates, emphasizing to the sus-
pect that the interrogators need to hear his side of the story is
one strategy through which interrogators can suggest to the
suspect that waiving the Miranda rights will gain him some
benefit. Then, the interrogator makes it clear that the suspect
will only be able to tell his side of the story if he first waives his
Miranda rights. When this strategy is effectively employed,
some suspects will be so eager to tell their side of the story that
they can hardly wait to waive their rights.2°4
The interrogation of McConnell Adams, an excerpt of
which appears at the introduction of this Article,2 5 depicts a
particularly masterful employment of this strategy. Before
questioning Adams, the interrogators tell him that the answers
he gives them over the next few minutes are going to have im-
portant consequences for his future. They are "going to change
[his] life" and "dictate how [his] life is going to be.' 206 At this
point, Adams would likely believe that it is inevitable that he is
going to answer the interrogators' questions and that he can
help himself by giving the "right" answers.
The interrogators then make it clear to Adams that they
know what he did, but they need to determine "the whys and
an explanation so that the world knows that McConnell isn't a
cold-hearted, stone killer. 20 7 At this point, the benefit Adams
will receive by telling his story becomes clear. By explaining
why he killed the victim, Adams can show that he is not in fact
203. Id. at 9-10.
204. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 192.
205. See supra text accompanying note 1.
206. Interrogation Transcript of McConnell Adams, supra note 1, at 3.
207. Id. at 14.
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a "cold-hearted" killer; rather, as the interrogators have sur-
mised, he is someone who did not intend to kill, and thus will
be treated as someone who simply made a mistake. The inter-
rogators have already explained, moreover, that the answers
Adams provides concerning this subject will be so important
that they will dictate the course of his life. In order to take ad-
vantage of this opportunity, however, Adams must first waive
his Miranda rights. Not surprisingly, Adams elected to waive
his Miranda rights and make a statement admitting the kill-
ings.208
In both of these interrogations, the suspects were led to
believe that waiving their rights would lead to more lenient
treatment by the criminal justice system. If they responded to
the interrogators' questions, they might be viewed as some-
thing less than a heinous murderer. In both cases, however,
the interrogators avoided discussing the specific charges
against the suspects. Thus, it could not be said that the officers
explicitly indicated that the suspects' waiver of their Miranda
rights would lead to a reduction of charges.
In other cases, interrogators explicitly or implicitly suggest
to the suspect that if he waives his Miranda rights and pro-
vides a satisfactory explanation to the interrogators, the
charges against him will be diminished. In the interrogation of
Vince Yarborough (a juvenile), for example, an interrogator told
the suspect that he was arrested for two murders and assault,
read him his rights, and asked him if he understood. The in-
terrogation then proceeded as follows:
Suspect: Uh huh. Wait a minute, but what you're sayin, I'm
bein arrested for, for what'd you say, two-
Interrog 1: Actually for two homicides, or one, one homicide and
one beat, and one felony assault.
Suspect: Oh no.
Interrog 2: Yeah, unless we can find a reason or explanation for,
for what happened, that's, we have no choice based on
what we have.
Interrog 1: So do you understand your rights?
Suspect: Yeah, I understand what you're sayin.
Interrog 1: Okay, do you want to talk to us about it?
208. See id. McConnell Adams's subsequent statement to police was later
introduced at trial, and he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to life in prison without possibility of parole. See James A. McClear, Iverson
Killer Pleads Guilty in Jail Fight: Conviction in Struggle with Staff Will Send
Adams Jr. to Maximum Security Prison, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 13, 1998, at C4.
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Suspect: Yeah, I'll talk [inauclible]. 209
Based on the interrogator's statement to the effect that they
had no choice as to the charges unless they could find "a reason
or explanation for.., what happened," Yarborough would be
led to believe that his explanation might result in a reduction of
charges.
In the interrogation of Alex Garcia,210 another juvenile, the
interrogators suggested that the suspect's explanation might
not only lead to less serious charges but even, possibly, to no
charges at all. In Garcia's interrogation, the detectives read
the Miranda rights to the suspect. While the rights were being
read, the suspect asked with what he was being charged. One
of the detectives responded that there was a "possibility" that
the suspect's case would be handled by an adult court, a deter-
mination that would be made by the juvenile court judge on the
basis of, among other things, the seriousness of the offense. 211
The detective then completed his reading of the Miranda
warnings, and the suspect signed a card stating that he under-
stood the rights that had been read to him. The interrogation
then proceeded as follows:
Interrogator: .... Okay Alex. What we're, we're investigating, like I
told you and your father out there, a very serious
situation okay?
Suspect: Uh hm.
Interrogator: I don't know what your exact involvement in it at this
time, okay? Urn.
Suspect: Uh hm.
Interrogator: Obviously, uh, you know that we've been talking to
other people about this situation, okay?
Suspect: Uh hm.
Interrogator: Uh, we're gonna give you the opportunity to clear this
whole matter up and uh, thats gonna entail you an-
swering some questions to us. Okay? You feel com-
fortable with that?
Suspect: Pretty much, yeah. 212
Based on the interrogator's statement to the effect that the
suspect would have "the opportunity to clear this whole matter
209. Interrogation Transcript of Vince Yarborough, Vallejo Police Dep't,
Cal. 2-3 (1994) (on file with authors).
210. See Interrogation Transcript of Alex Garcia, Maricopa County Sheriffs
Office, Ariz. (Oct. 26, 1991) (on file with authors).
211. See id. at 5.
212. Id. at 6.
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up," the suspect could reasonably believe that his answers to
the interrogator's questions might lead to no charges being
brought against him or, at the very least, that he might be
charged as a juvenile rather than as an adult. Based on the
warnings that had just been read to him, moreover, the suspect
would understand that in order to "clear this whole matter up,"
he would first have to waive his Miranda rights.
Interrogators may also imply that the suspect's decision to
waive his Miranda rights and speak to the police may lead to
other types of benefits, such as obtaining help or treatment.
The interrogation of Prudencio Sanchez, who was accused of
sexually molesting his daughter, included this type of induce-
ment. Before giving Sanchez the Miranda warnings, the inter-
rogator gave Sanchez a voice stress analyzer test and told him
that he had failed the test. The interrogator then told Sanchez
that his conduct did not mean that he was a terrible person.
Rather, it showed that he needed help. The interrogator elabo-
rated this theme as follows:
Interrogator: ... [We think you have a problem and you need help
before that problem gets bigger, you have to get help
from a professional who can give you some advice so
that you can continue with your life and go forward,
because if you don't do anything about this, what you
have done with your daughter, it will go to something
worse, it's going to get worse and that will cause you
more damage, to you and your family or the other per-
son who you do this to. Because it's not normal but
neither are you a very dangerous person, you are not a
criminal who's going to frighten people. But that there
are people who need help for your problem, we believe
that you are a person who needs professional help to
give you advice, so that this does not happen again and
you can go on with your life. Right now you have sev-
eral problems with your family with this and you have
to take care of one by one because if you don't take care
of any, you are not going to be well, mentally, you are
not going to be well. And that's one of the reasons why
we are here. Not just to tell you "you're lying" and it's
now over, no, what we want is to (know) how did this
problem come about, how did it start and why, and to
find someone who can give you advice and who can
give you some good guidance so that you can go on in-
stead of being stuck here, and that just because, be-
cause this happened my life is over. No, you have to
think about your future. You're what, 33 years old? 33
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years, you're relatively young, you have to think about
your children.2 3
Shortly after this statement; the detective read Sanchez his
Miranda rights. Sanchez waived his rights and made an in-
criminating statement.
Significantly, the interrogator did not suggest to Sanchez
that he could reduce his criminal punishment by explaining his
conduct. Rather, the interrogator emphasized to the suspect
that he should explain how his "problem c[a]me about" so that
the authorities could provide him with "professional help" and
guidance. A suspect hearing this statement might believe that
if he explained his conduct, the authorities would be concerned
with treating his problem rather than imposing punishment.
Even if the suspect believed that his explanation for his con-
duct would not diminish his punishment, he might still be in-
clined to waive his rights and explain his conduct, believing
that this course of action would be necessary to obtain the
treatment he needed.
As these examples illustrate, interrogators induce Miranda
waivers by offering suspects a wide range of benefits. Moreo-
ver, while interrogators sometimes offer explicit benefits, im-
plicit inducements, where the precise benefit to be obtained is
unstated, may be even more powerful. When this strategy is
effectively employed, the suspect subjected to it is highly likely
to waive his Miranda rights and make a statement to the po-
lice.214
D. STRATEGIES EMPLOYED WHEN THE SUSPECT INVOKES HIS
MIRANDA RIGHTS
When a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or his
right to an attorney, the interrogator's strategy may be dictated
by time constraints. If the suspect is going to remain in the in-
terrogator's custody for a period of time, the interrogator is
likely to cease questioning and give the suspect "a chance to sit
and stew.., for a little while and see if he changes his
mind."215 In this situation, the police hope that allowing the
suspect time for reflection may convince him that he can come
213. Interrogation Transcript of Prudencio Sanchez, Monterey County
Sheriffs Office, Cal. 37-38 (Oct. 1997) (on file with authors).
214. In all of the cases from which excerpts were drawn in this section, the
suspect waived his Miranda rights and eventually made either incriminating
statements or a full confession.
215. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 189.
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up with a story that he can sell to the authorities.216 If the sus-
pect does not adopt this strategy on his own, then, as the
D'Entremont case indicates,217 the interrogator may use subtle
tactics to suggest that it may be in his best interest to present
his side of the story to the police.
The interrogator's strategy may be different, lowever, if
she has only "one shot" at the suspect.218 Modern interrogation
training videos inform interrogators that, if they believe "it's
now or never," because the suspect will soon have a lawyer pre-
sent or be removed from the interrogator's custody,219 they
might want to question suspects despite their invocation of
their rights.220
Interrogators who follow this advice may take one of two
approaches. As Charles Weisselberg has shown, they may
question the suspect "outside Miranda."221  Interrogators
adopting this strategy specifically inform the suspect that they
are questioning him despite his invocation of his rights, sug-
gesting, however, that the suspect need not be concerned about
his statements being used against him, because he is being
questioned "off the record" or "outside Miranda."222 The impli-
cations of questioning "outside Miranda" are considered in
Parts IV and V.
In addition, the interrogator may respond to a suspect's in-
vocation of his rights by simply trying to get him to change his
mind. In some cases, interrogators adopting this approach will
not be particularly subtle. In one case, for example, an interro-
gator responded to the suspect's repeated requests for a lawyer
by simply asking her why she wanted a lawyer.223 In an effort
to elicit statements, the interrogator might then recount the
evidence against the suspect. For example:
Interrogator: You did this-this wound. This was bitten by you. You
left this wound, you know? This is one hundred per-
cent positive, do you know? We could take the evidence
to court and indicate to them that this wound was bit-
ten by you. In court they will believe us, you know?
216. See id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 157-77.
218. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 189.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 190-94.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 132-40.
223. See Interrogation Transcript of Lisa Peng, Orange County Sheriffs






Okay, then I-then I want to get a lawyer.
Why do you want a lawyer?
Yes, because you have been saying that positively I
was the one who bit her. That's correct, even though I
do hate my husband. He did this-
Interrogator: Let's not talk about-talk about your husband?2 4
And again:
Suspect: Oh-I want to get a lawyer-to come
Interrogator: Let me ask you this? If you found a lawyer that what
can he do for you?
Suspect: He will continue to investigate.
Interrogator: He will not continue to investigate. He will lie for you,
do you know that? He should be sitting next to you
and speak on behalf of you. He wouldn't investigate.
Suspect: Why wouldn't he investigate for me?
Interrogator: He could-could investigate in person. The result of
the investigation is that they would be receiving the
evidence from the evidence that we had investigated,
you know? But it would be different type of evidence.
The evidence would not change, you know? Even if you
found a lawyer here we would still have asked the
same question? We know that you did this act? If you
did this then you should take responsibility and not in-
volve anybody else? Especially your two sons?n 5
The interrogator continued to question the suspect, eventually
eliciting a confession.
In other cases, interrogators respond to a suspect's appar-
ent invocation of his rights by purporting to misunderstand the
suspect.226 By redirecting the flow of the conversation, the in-
224. Id. at 99-100.
225. Id. at 120.
226. Consider the following interrogation of Martinez Davis:
Interrog 1: Okay, as I said earlier, I'm going to read those rights to
you again, okay? Uh, you understand that you have
the right to remain silent? You understand that?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrog 1: Okay. You also understand that everything you say
can and will be used against you in a court of law. You
understand that right?
Suspect: Yes.
Interrog 1: Can you speak up?
Suspect: Yes.
Interrog 1: Okay. You also understand that you have a right to
have a lawyer and to have him present with you while
you're being questioned. Do you understand that?
Suspect: Yes.
Interrog 1: Uh, if-if you cannot afford, uh, you know, one will be
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terrogator can then sometimes get the suspect to change his
mind and ostensibly waive his Miranda rights.227 During the
interrogation of Prudencio Sanchez, for example, the suspect
initially stated that he did not want to speak to the interroga-
tor.228 The interrogator then asked the suspect to clarify his
position. The suspect stated that telling his story was not "now
necessary."2 29 In the course of reiterating the suspect's rights,
the interrogator then suggested to him that if he exercised his
right to remain silent, the interrogator would "never know ex-
actly what [his] point of view [was]."230 After the interrogator
repeated the suspect's rights, the suspect waived them and
eventually made incriminating statements.
appointed for you before any questioning, do you un-
derstand that?
Suspect: Yes.
Interrog 1: Okay. If at anytime while you're being interviewed, if
you decide, uh, you want to stop this statement, uh,
we'll no longer question you and the interview will
cease. Do you understand that?
Suspect: Yes.
Interrog 1: Okay. Now at this time do you wish to give up that
right and make this statement?
Suspect: If it's supposed to be better, I'll do it.
Interrog 2: Okay. I mean, yes or no. Do you want to make?
Interrog 1: Yes or no? Do you want to make this statement?
Interrog 2: Do you want to talk about the same thing we talked
about all over?
Suspect: Not-not on this.
Interrog 2: What?
Suspect: Not on this.
Interrog 2: I don't understand what you mean.
Interrogation Transcript of Martinez Davis, St. Louis Police Dep't, Mo. 2-3
(Mar. 22, 1997) (on file with authors).
227. From a legal standpoint, purporting to misunderstand whether the
suspect invoked one of her Miranda rights can be an extremely effective strat-
egy. If the interrogator can establish that a reasonable person in the officer's
position would not understand that the suspect was invoking her right to an
attorney, then based on the Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452 (1994), the interrogator can properly disregard the suspect's invoca-
tion of her right. In Davis, the Court "decline[d] to adopt a rule requiring offi-
cers to ask clarifying questions" when "a suspect makes a statement that
might be a request for an attorney." Id. at 461. Rather, it held that "after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers
may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an at-
torney." Id.






IV. THE DUE PROCESS VOLUNTARINESS TEST
In assessing Miranda's impact on law enforcement, the due
process voluntariness test is significant for two reasons: first, if
Miranda were overruled, that test would provide the principal
protection for suspects subjected to police interrogation; and,
second, when current police interrogators seek to obtain im-
peachment statements or physical evidence by questioning sus-
pects "outside Miranda," the due process test provides the
standard for determining whether statements obtained by such
questioning will be admissible for purposes of impeachment.
If Miranda's core holding-the requirement that the police
warn suspects of their rights and obtain a valid waiver of those
rights before engaging in custodial interrogation 231-were over-
ruled, what constitutional safeguards would be afforded to sus-
pects subjected to police interrogation? Although various com-
mentators have advocated replacements for Miranda,232
Dickerson's result suggests that the practical effect of a ruling
allowing Miranda to be replaced by legislatively enacted safe-
guards would be the total elimination of Miranda-like safe-
guards. Accordingly, only the other presently existing constitu-
tional restrictions on police interrogation would remain in
effect.
Before the privilege against self-incrimination was held to
apply to custodial interrogation, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed restraints on police interroga-
tion.233 In a line of cases beginning with Brown v. Missis-
231. As Professor Schulhofer has pointed out, "Miranda contains not one
holding but a complex series of holdings." Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 436.
Thus, the Court held both 'that informal pressure to speak-that is, pressure
not backed by legal process or any formal sanction-can constitute 'compul-
sion' within the meaning of the fifth amendment" and that "this element of in-
formal compulsion is present in any questioning of a suspect in custody." Id.
In terms of regulating police interrogation practices, however, the Court's core
holding barred the admission of a suspect's statement obtained during custo-
dial interrogation unless prior to such interrogation, the interrogating officer
gave the suspect the Miranda warnings and the suspect validly waived the
rights iterated in those warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
232. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 18, at 496-97 (advocating that Miranda's
warning and waiver requirements be replaced by a different set of warnings
and the requirement that interrogations be videotaped); Phillip E. Johnson, A
Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 303
(1987) (setting out a statutory replacement for Miranda's warnings and
waiver requirement).
233. See generally Hancock, supra note 13, at 2203-32 (tracing the evolu-
tion of the pre-Miranda due process voluntariness test).
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sippi,234 the Court held that the Due Process Clause barred the
admission of confessions determined to be involuntary.235 Until
the mid-1960s, the due process test provided the only constitu-
tional basis for regulating the admissibility of defendants'
statements.236 In 1966, however, Miranda held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege applies to custodial interrogation.237
Based on the post-Miranda Court's Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the due process voluntariness test provides the standard
for determining whether a confession was obtained in violation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege.238 In several contexts,
moreover, the Court has held that the due process voluntari-
ness test, rather than Miranda, provides the controlling stan-
dard for determining the admissibility of defendants' state-
ments.239 Most significantly, the Court has held that when the
government seeks to introduce a defendant's statement against
him for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, rather than
strengthening the government's case-in-chief, the due process
voluntariness test provides the standard for determining the
statement's admissibility.240 As a result of the government's
frequent attempts to introduce statements obtained in violation
234. 297 u.s. 278 (1936).
235. See generally Yale Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963), reprinted in KAMISAR, supra note 16, at 1-25.
236. In 1964, the Court decided Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), both holding that defen-
dants' confessions were inadmissible because the police violated their Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel.
237. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (implying
that a confession's admissibility under the Fifth Amendment privilege will be
determined on the basis of "traditional due process" standards); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (holding that the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege was not violated because his statement was voluntary).
239. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (holding that
when statements derived from improperly obtained statements are at issue,
subsequent statements may not be excluded as fruit of first statement unless
first statement shown to be involuntary under due process test rather than
merely obtained in violation of Miranda); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56 & n.5
(stating that the due process test governs admissibility of statements falling
within Miranda's public safety exception). For a humorous comment on the
practical impact of the Court's exceptions to Miranda, see Albert W. Alschuler,
Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436,
1443 (1987) (describing a fictitious police advisor explaining the Supreme
Court's interrogation decisions to the police: "The Supreme Court has said that
pre-Miranda voluntariness standards are part of the 'real' Constitution.
Miranda is part of the Court's just pretend' Constitution").
240. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978).
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of Miranda for the purposes of impeachment,241 courts have de-
veloped considerable experience in applying the post-Miranda
due process test.242
Post-Miranda cases dealing with the admissibility for im-
peachment purposes of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda are pertinent because, at least in situations where the
Miranda violation occurred as a result of the interrogators'
failure to stop interrogating a suspect who invoked his
Miranda rights,243 the impeachment cases show some of the
situations in which overruling Miranda would make a differ-
ence for defendants. Statements that had been inadmissible
under Miranda might be admissible under the post-Miranda
due process test, thereby providing the police with greater ac-
cess to statements.
244
Furthermore, even if Miranda is never overruled, the post-
Miranda impeachment cases have diminished Miranda's cur-
rent costs to law enforcement. While a statement admissible
for purposes of impeaching a suspect's credibility is not as
valuable as a statement admissible in the government's case-
in-chief,245 the former statements have considerable value to
law enforcement. Statements admissible for the purpose of im-
peaching the defendant's testimony may deter the defendant
from testifying on his own behalf. In addition, based on the
Court's dicta in Oregon v. Elstad, it appears that evidence, in-
cluding both witnesses and tangible evidence, derived from a
241. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 127.
242. See id. at 113 (citing numerous cases).
243. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 715-16 (1975).
244. In some cases in which a suspect asserts his right to have counsel pre-
sent at interrogation, the suspect might later "initiate" further communica-
tions with the police, thus allowing the police another opportunity to induce a
waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
1039, 1045 (1983). When this happens, the suspect may waive his Miranda
rights, thus enabling the interrogator to obtain an incriminating statement.
245. A statement admissible for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's
credibility will not be admissible unless the defendant testifies in his defense
at trial. Although the government has sometimes argued that statements ob-
tained from a defendant in violation of Miranda may be used for the purpose
of impeaching other witnesses that argument has been uniformly rejected.
See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (refus-
ing to allow the government to admit defendant's statements obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda for the purpose of rebutting defense expert psychiatric tes-
timony); cf., e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990) (holding that
defendant's statements obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment-
which would be admissible for the purposes of impeaching the defendant's




statement obtained in violation of Miranda may be introduced
by the government as part of its case-in-chief.246 Thus, when
interrogators are able to obtain impeaching evidence by ques-
tioning suspects "outside Miranda," Miranda provides fewer
limitations on law enforcement.247 Of course, the extent to
which interrogators will be able to obtain such statements also
depends on the law governing the statements' admissibility.
A. IMPEACHMENT CASES DECIDED UNDER THE POST-MIRANDA
DUE PROCESS TEST
In Harris v. New York, 248 the Court established the im-
peachment exception to Miranda,249 holding that statements
obtained from a defendant in violation of Miranda are admissi-
ble for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility in
the event that he testifies in his own defense at trial.250 In
Oregon v. Hass,251 the Court extended Harris, holding that the
impeachment exception applies even when the police violate
Miranda by interrogating a suspect after he responds to the
Miranda warnings by invoking his right to have an attorney
present at questioning.252 In both Harris and Hass, the Court
246. 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
247. Although statements admissible only for the purpose of impeaching a
defendant's credibility are obviously of less value than statements admissible
in the government's case-in-chief, the former statements will often be of con-
siderable value. Assuming the government has other sufficient evidence to
present its case to the jury, the government's possession of a statement admis-
sible for impeaching the defendant's testimony may deter the defendant from
testifying, thus weakening the defendant's case and creating questions in the
jury's mind as to the meaning of his silence. On the other hand, if the defen-
dant does testify in his own defense, the admission of the government's im-
peaching evidence may be extremely persuasive to the jury because, even
though the jury will be instructed to consider this evidence only for the pur-
pose of impeaching the defendant's credibility, the jury will often find it diffi-
cult to follow these instructions. Moreover, in contrast to statements admitted
in the government's case-in-chief, these statements will be heard by the jury
late in the trial, when their potential for influencing the jury may be highest.
248. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
249. For articles considering the impeachment exception to Miranda, see
generally Jeffrey Caminsky, Rebuttal Use of Suppressed Statements: The Lim-
its of Miranda, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 199 (1986); Alan M. Dershowitz & John
Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Kainen, su-
pra note 48, at 1301; Stone, supra note 14, at 106-15.
250. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
251. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
252. In Hass, the defendant was given the Miranda warnings after he was
arrested for burglary. See id. at 715. While en route to the police station, the
454 [Vol. 84:397
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indicated that the impeachment exception would not apply if
the evidence the government sought to introduce was obtained
in violation of the due process voluntariness test.253
Since establishing the impeachment exception to Miranda,
the Court only once has addressed whether a statement used
by the government for impeachment purposes was admissible
under the due process voluntariness test.254 In Mincey v. Ari-
zona,255 the defendant was seriously wounded in a narcotics
raid in which an officer was killed.256 Just a few hours later, a
detective questioned the defendant in the intensive care unit of
a hospital.257 Lying on his back in a bed, encumbered by tubes,
needles, and breathing apparatus, the defendant was unable to
talk and could respond to the detective only by writing answers
on pieces of paper provided by the hospital.258 At about 8 p.m.,
the detective gave the defendant the required Miranda warn-
ings.259 When the detective started to question the defendant
about the events surrounding the shooting, the defendant
wrote, "This is all I can say without a lawyer. 2 60 The detective
nevertheless continued to question the defendant, and a nurse
who was present suggested to the defendant that it would be
best for him to answer the questions.261 After giving several
defendant told the arresting officer that he wanted to call his lawyer. See id.
The officer told the defendant that he could do that after they arrived at the
police station. See id. at 715-16. While still en route to the station, the defen-
dant asked the officer if he had to locate some of the stolen property. See
Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 183 (citing Hass, 420 U.S. app. at 21-24). The
officer replied that defendant was not obligated to do so, but he wanted to get
the matter cleared up that night. Defendant then revealed the location of the
stolen property to the officer.
253. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 723 ("If, in a given case, the officer's conduct
amounts to abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be
taken care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evalu-
ating voluntariness and trustworthiness."); Harris, 401 U.S. at 224 (observing
that the defendant did not claim that his confession was involuntary under the
traditional due process test).
254. During the post-Miranda era, the Court has addressed the question
whether a confession was voluntary under the post-Miranda due process test
in three cases: Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), Colorado v. Con-
nelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See gener-
ally White, supra note 58, at 2014-20.
255. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
256. See id. at 387.
257. See id. at 396.
258. See id.
259. See id.




unresponsive or uninformative answers to the detective's ques-
tions, the defendant again asked for a lawyer.262 The detective
ignored this "request and another made immediately thereaf-
ter.2 63 Although the defendant repeatedly requested that the
detective stop questioning him, the detective continued the in-
terrogation until nearly midnight, questioning the defendant
continuously except "during intervals when [the latter] lost
consciousness or received medical treatment."26 4
In a terse opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court, with only
Justice Rehnquist dissenting, held that the defendant's state-
ment to the detective was involuntary under the Due Process
Clause.265 In justifying this conclusion, the Court first stated
that the defendant "wanted not to answer" the detective. 266 It
went on to observe that the defendant was overwhelmed by the
detective's relentless questioning.267 While the pressure ex-
erted by the police was less in this case than in many previous
due process cases, the Court emphasized that the defendant
was not in a condition that permitted him to resist the degree
of pressure exerted: "weakened by pain and shock, isolated
from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely con-
scious,... his will was simply overborne." 268
Mincey's analysis, unfortunately, does not provide clear
guidelines for determining when evidence obtained in violation
of Miranda will be inadmissible under the due process test.
Based on the Court's conclusion that the defendant "wanted not
to answer" the detective,269 Mincey could be interpreted as
holding that a due process violation will occur when the police
continue to interrogate a suspect whose response to the
Miranda warnings and/or police efforts to question him make it
unmistakably clear that he does not wish to be interrogated.270
On the other hand, the Court's holding did not rely solely on
the defendant's repeated invocation of his right not to answer
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 401.
265. See id. at 402.
266. Id. at 401.
267. See id. at 401-02.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 401.
270. In order to distinguish Hass, Mincey's broadly interpreted holding
could be limited to situations in which a suspect repeatedly invokes his rights,
thus making it unmistakably clear to the police that the suspect did not want
to answer questions without the presence of an attorney.
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questions without the presence of counsel. To the contrary,
Justice Stewart's opinion emphasized the defendant's inability
to resist the unrelenting pressure exerted by the detective.271
Thus, Mincey could also be interpreted as holding that the de-
fendant's confession was involuntary, because the defendant
was unable to resist the extreme coercive pressure exerted by
the police. Under this narrower reading of Mincey, which is
consistent with cases decided under both the pre-272 and post-
Miranda273 due process voluntariness test, courts would have to
determine on a case-by-case basis whether the interrogation
techniques employed by the police were either so coercive or "so
offensive to a civilized system of justice" as to render a defen-
dant's resulting statement involuntary.274
B. THE LOWER COURT IMPEACHMENT CASES
Predictably, lower courts have interpreted Mincey nar-
rowly. Despite the Court's stated concern that interrogating
officers not obtain impeachment evidence through tactics that
would constitute an "abuse" of Miranda,275 lower courts have
generally held that a mere showing that an officer ignored or
disregarded a suspect's repeated invocation of his Miranda
rights does not render a suspect's statement inadmissible for
impeachment purposes.27 6 Rather, lower courts have deter-
mined the admissibility of impeachment evidence solely on the
basis of the due process voluntariness test, which involves an
evaluation of the "totality of circumstances," including an ex-
271. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401-02.
272. See generally Hancock, supra note 13, at 2220-32 (discussing pre-
Miranda due process cases in which the defendant's confession was held in-
voluntary); Herman, supra note 93, at 747-49 (seeking to determine the
meaning of a pre-Miranda involuntary confession through analyzing holdings
in cases in which the Court held the defendant's confession involuntary).
273. See generally White, supra note 58, at 2014-20 (discussing post-
Miranda cases decided under the Due Process Clause).
274. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (quoting Miller v. Fen-
ton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).
275. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975); see also supra note 252
and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., State v. Burris, 679 A.2d 121, 135-36 (N.J. 1996) (holding de-
fendant's statement admissible for impeachment because it was freely and
voluntarily given even though police denied defendant's request for counsel
before obtaining the statement); People v. Winsett, 606 N.E.2d 1186, 1199 (Ill.
1992) (holding defendant's statement voluntary even though police three times
denied defendant's request for an attorney).
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amination of the defendant's background 77 and physical cir-
cumstances, 278 as well as the interrogation techniques em-
ployed by the police.279
In practice, the lower courts applying this test have im-
posed few restraints on police interrogation methods. As under
the pre-Miranda due process cases,280 interrogation tactics in-
volving force or threat of force are prohibited.28' However, nei-
ther lengthy questioning,28 2 trickery,2 3 nor the repeated denial
of the suspect's request to confer with counsel 28 4 will be suffi-
cient by itself to render a suspect's statement inadmissible for
the purposes of impeachment. 28 5
277. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 n.2 (1991) (applying "to-
tality of circumstances" test, the Court took into account defendant's low in-
telligence, slight build, short stature, poor adaptation to prison stress, and his-
tory of psychiatric problems); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-22 n.3
(1959) (considering factors such as defendant's lack of a high school education,
status as "foreign-born" and failure of an army intelligence test).
278. Thus, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court took into
account the defendant's weakened physical condition. Id. at 398-99. In deal-
ing with the admissibility of impeachment evidence, several lower courts have
distinguished Mincey on the ground that injured defendants questioned by the
police after they invoked their Miranda rights were in less debilitating physi-
cal condition than the defendant in Mincey. See United States v. Martin, 781
F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding defendant's statement voluntary despite
the fact that defendant was "groggy" from the effects of Demerol); State v.
Vickers, 768 P.2d 1177, 1184 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (finding defendant's
statement voluntary because, although he suffered from smoke inhalation, his
condition "was not as serious as Mincey's").
279. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) ("[Clertain inter-
rogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteris-
tics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that
they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
280. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) ("Interrogation
per se is not, while violence per se is, an outlaw.") (Jackson, J., dissenting).
281. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 483 So. 2d 363, 368 (Miss. 1986) (stating in
dicta that a confession "which came about as a result of threats [or] physical
mistreatment... cannot be used at all, either in the state's case-in-chief or for
impeachment purposes").
282. See, e.g., Bastides v. Henderson, 664 F. Supp. 51, 53-54 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that suspect's statement was voluntary when made after 10
hours in custody).
283. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding that police
trickery in inducing a confession is not sufficient in itself to render the confes-
sion involuntary under the due process test).
284. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
285. Under the "totality of circumstances" test, a combination of these fac-
tors may, of course, be sufficient to render a confession involuntary. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding suspect's Fifth
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Interrogation tactics that mislead suspects as to the ad-
missibility of statements given during questioning "outside
Miranda"286 have not been consistently dealt with by lower
courts. When a suspect responds to the Miranda warnings by
stating that he does not want to answer questions without an
attorney, an interrogator who elects to question the suspect
"outside Miranda" may respond by telling the suspect that he
'still would like to know what happened .... 287 In seeking to
persuade the suspect to answer questions, the interrogator may
then mislead the suspect as to the admissibility of statements
made during the questioning. The interrogator may blatantly
misrepresent the law by telling the suspect that his answers to
the officer's questions will not be admissible against him,288 or,
without directly lying to the suspect, engage in tactics that are
calculated to misinform the suspect as to the extent to which
his statements to the interrogator will be admissible. The in-
terrogator may tell the suspect that what he says to the officer
will be "off the record,"289 or he may reassure the suspect by
promising him that his statement is "not gonna be used against
you-in the case-in-chief-against you, okay?"2 90 In either case,
the average suspect is not likely to understand that statements
he makes to the interrogator may be used for the purpose of
impeaching his credibility if he testifies in his own defense.
29 1
Amendment rights were violated after police attempted to trick him into
waiving Miranda rights, held him incommunicado for nearly 24 hours and re-
peatedly badgered him to confess even after he asserted his right to have
counsel present at questioning).
286. The term questioning "outside Miranda" has been used in police
training courses to describe situations in which interrogators question sus-
pects even though statements obtained from the questioning wil be impermis-
sible under Miranda. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 133-36.
287. Id. at 161 (quoting Transcript of Interview of James McNally, People
v. McNally 2-5 (Mar. 2, 1993)).
288. See, e.g., Linares v. State, 471 S.E.2d 208, 211-12 (Ga. 1996) (holding
defendant's confession involuntary on the ground that police told defendant
that any information he provided would not be used against him).
289. E.g., People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 566 (Cal. 1997).
290. E.g., Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 161 (quoting from Transcript of
Interview of James McNally, People v. McNally 2-5 (Mar. 2, 1993)). In order
to minimize the possibility that the suspect would believe that the statement
could be used against him in any way, the detective added, "Just, this is for
our edification of what happened." Id.
291. In addition, the suspect is unlikely to know that, under the Court's
decisions in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985), and Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974), evidence derived from statements obtained
in violation of Miranda will likely be admissible against him.
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When addressing the admissibility for impeachment pur-
poses of statements obtained through these tactics, lower
courts have split. At least two state courts have held that even
statements obtained after an interrogator's deliberate misrep-
resentation as to the admissibility of the suspect's statement
may be introduced for the purpose of impeachment.292 Courts
in at least one other state-Georgia293-have held, however,
that this form of misrepresentation is sufficient to render the
suspect's statement a violation of due process.
The due process impeachment cases show that interroga-
tors questioning suspects "outside Miranda" may, ironically, be
able to use suspects' knowledge of their Miranda rights as a
powerful interrogation tactic.294 Through their use of the
Miranda warnings, interrogators can induce suspects to talk by
leading them to believe falsely that statements they make can-
not be used against them in any way. Thus, the interrogators
are essentially able to turn Miranda inside out. Instead of in-
dicating to suspects that they are confronted with an adversary
situation, which was one of the purposes of Miranda,295 inter-
rogators are able to use the Miranda warnings to lead suspects
to believe that it is not against their interests to talk when it
really is.
V. STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY INTERROGATORS
QUESTIONING "OUTSIDE MIRANDA"
The basic strategy employed by interrogators who question
"outside Miranda" is fairly simple. As Weisselberg's account of
such interrogations shows, the interrogator's objective is to
convince the suspect that he can talk to the interrogator with-
292. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1223-24 (Cal. 1998); Bradford, 929
P.2d at 568; State v. Favero, 331 N.W.2d 259, 262-63 (Neb. 1983). In Favero,
the defendant requested an attorney, but none was provided. See 331 N.W.2d
at 261. The detective proceeded to question the defendant, telling him that
anything he said was "off the record" and could not be used as an admission in
court. See id. Although it characterized the police conduct as illegal, see id. at
262, the Nebraska Supreme Court nevertheless held that defendant's state-
ment was admissible for impeachment purposes because it was voluntary. See
id. at 263.
293. See Linares, 471 S.E.2d at 211-12.
294. See generally Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 132-40 (describing how
some police officers are being trained to continue questioning a suspect who
has asserted his or her Fifth Amendment rights).
295. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
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out any fear that his words will be used against him.2 96 To
achieve this goal, the interrogator either may tell the suspect
explicitly that nothing he says can be used against him,297 im-
plicitly communicate the same message through statements to
the effect that the suspect's answers will be "off the record,"298
or tell the suspect that his statement will be used only to help
the interrogator understand what happened.299
Since questioning "outside Miranda" is a relatively new in-
terrogation strategy,3°° which appears to be employed only in
discrete situations, 30' interrogators would not be expected to
have refined this strategy to the same extent as they have re-
fined other strategies, such as de-emphasizing the Miranda
warnings.30 2 Nevertheless, transcripts of recent interrogations
suggest that interrogators employing this strategy have devel-
oped at least two refinements: first, emphasizing through
down-to-earth language that the suspect's statements can have
no legal significance and second, making it clear to the suspect
that making an "off-the-record" statement will be to his advan-
tage.
When a suspect invokes his right to an attorney, he is obvi-
ously concerned about placing himself in legal jeopardy. There-
fore, it is especially important for the interrogator to convince
the suspect that his words cannot be used against him in any
way. As the following example indicates, through repetition
and the use of down-to-earth language, an interrogator can de-
liver this message in a way that will be persuasive to the sus-
pect:
Interrogator: I mean everything you tell us right now I'm not gonna
be able to use any way James because you've already
said you're gonna, you want an attorney. Okay? So
what, whatever you tell me right now, it's not gonna be
admissible anyway. You know what I'm saying.
You're smart enough to realize that and I'm being up
296. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 132-40, 189-92.
297. See supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
298. See United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1027 (3d Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that the detective told the suspect he could tell the police what happened
"off the cuff").
299. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 161.
300. Weisselberg does not say when interrogators first began to employ
this strategy. The training video cited in his article, which advises interroga-
tors as to how to employ the strategy was apparently made in 1990. See id. at
189.
301. See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
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front with you anyway right now as we're speaking.
Okay? You've already said you wanted an attorney
and you've been, you've been in court before where,
where you know where you said, where they said,
"Well this evidence, this testimony is not admissible
because my client already went ahead and said he
wanted an attorney."33
Suspect: So what I don't understand if, whatever I say right
now is, you know, you can't use because I said I wanted
to talk to a lawyer?
Interrogator: No, no you, unless you say, unless you say "Detective I
want to go on the record," okay? I mean everything
you say right now is not gonna be used against you. I'll
tell you that right now. I already know, I already
know that you are the person responsible. Okay, that's
my, that's my feeling okay? That is my, that's just my
feeling. I'm being very up front with you, okay. Ah if I
was to say, "No I don't think it's you. I think it's some-
body else," well I'd be bullshiting you. I'm just telling
you straight.
Suspect: Yeah, I know.
Interrogator: Okay, all I'm interested is finding out the facts. You
can tell me off the record, that's fine. I can't use that.
I would like it to be on record but that would only be
with, with, with, with you saying, "Fine, I will go
ahead and tell you and I want it on the record and I
realize, I realize that I don't have, that I can have an
attorney." But I want to tell you, I mean you know
without that, I mean you know whatever you tell me
right now doesn't mean a hill of beans. You can tell me
that you've murdered 50 people here and that they're
buried here, here and there. So what? You know, so
what?304
The suspect eventually made incriminating statements to the
interrogator.
In some situations, of course, an interrogator questioning a
suspect "outside Miranda" also needs to convince the suspect
that there will be some advantage to making a statement to the
authorities. For this purpose, interrogators employ essentially
the same stratagems that are used to induce a suspect to waive
his Miranda rights. Thus, after the suspect in one case invoked
his right to an attorney, the interrogation proceeded as follows:
303. Interrogation Transcript of James Nimblett, San Diego Police Dep't,
Cal. 36 (July 30, 1990) (on file with authors).






Okay. Let me explain something to you Mark. Now let
me just, off the record, between the three of us. You're
looking at a few years of experience here, okay? And
we know pretty much what happened because that's
our job. We also know that having handled a number
of cases that what occurs at a later date and like I say,
this is just off the record, just between the three of us,
because we're just detectives, we're curious about
things that we see physically, we're just kind of curious
how it happened. Sometimes, I know that when you
get yourself in a situation like this, it really looks
bleak. You say to yourself, "Man, this is bad." But I
find and my partners here have found that sometimes
there is mitigation. There's a reason why things hap-
pen. You see what I'm saying and for whatever reason,
it just happens. It's what you call like a "heat of pas-
sion." And a lot of times with males and females,
that's what happens. You get into a little situation.
You know you try to get next to one another and things
don't work out, that's all. And one person gets pissed
off and you know through no fault of anybody's once in
awhile, they have a couple of drinks, you know, and
their minds just not working like it normally does. We
understand that. But those are things we have to
know, those are things in all honesty are in your de-
fense. You see what I'm saying? Otherwise, you're
just stuck. It's like looking at one side of the coin and
saying, "But there's two sides of the coin." And that's,
I know you've never found yourself in any kind of trou-
ble before like this, and you're saying to yourself,
"Okay, this is, this is."
Yeah.
This is, yeah, this is something that I didn't know
about, but what I'm trying to tell you is that sometimes
you just have to, you know, it's easier to talk about it.
You understand what I'm saying? I can say it's off the
record, I just want to, just from an investigative stand-
point, we're just curious how you even got involved
with her
s5
The suspect chose to speak to the detectives and confessed at
trial, where his confession was introduced for the purposes of
impeaching his testimony.306 He was convicted and eventually
sentenced to death.307
305. Interrogation Transcript of Mark Alan Bradford, L.A. Police Dep't,
Cal. 36 (Apr. 19, 1988) (on file with authors).
306. See People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 555 (Cal. 1997).
307. See id. at 550-51.
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VI. A WORLD WITHOUT MIRANDA
In order to determine whether Miranda's warnings and
waiver requirement provide an adequate constitutional safe-
guard, society needs to decide the extent to which law enforce-
ment officers interrogating criminal suspects should be re-
strained, and the extent to which individuals subjected to such
interrogation should be protected. Data relating to the various
ways in which interrogators have adapted to Miranda cannot,
of course, answer these fundamental questions.30 8 That data
does, however, shed light on some of the issues that have been
viewed as significant by both Miranda's proponents and detrac-
tors.
Specifically, the post-Miranda Supreme Court decisions
provide some insight as to how courts might be expected to deal
with police interrogation cases in a world without Miranda.
Also, the empirical data relating to how modern interrogators
are able to avoid the obstacles posed by Miranda provide some
basis for predicting the effect that overruling Miranda's core
holding would have on police interrogation practices, the avail-
ability of incriminating statements to law enforcement, and the
experience of individuals subjected to police interrogation.
A. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
The due process impeachment cases provide a lens through
which we can glimpse how interrogation cases might be dealt
with in a world without Miranda's warning and waiver re-
quirements. As the Mincey case illustrates, the due process
test provides few guidelines for the police. 309 If the post-
Miranda due process test were to replace Miranda, the police
would not be prohibited from employing interrogation tactics
that are likely to exert considerable pressure on the average
suspect.310 In contrast to our present system, moreover, sus-
308. Striking the appropriate balance between the interests of law en-
forcement and suspects involves ethical issues as well as empirical and policy
questions. See George C. Thomas III, The Twenty-First Century: A World
Without Miranda?, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING,
supra note 93, at 314.
309. See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safe-
guards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105,
116 (1997) (observing that "[tihe post-Miranda due process test provides es-
sentially the same relatively scant guidelines on interrogation methods as the
pre-Miranda test").
310. See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
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pects subjected to these tactics would not have the option of
preventing or terminating interrogation by invoking either
their right to remain silent or their right to have an attorney
present at questioning. Even if the police repeatedly denied the
suspect's request for counsel,311 subsequent statements ob-
tained by the police might be held to be admissible.
Thus, if Miranda were replaced by the post-Miranda due
process voluntariness test, the most obvious difference would
be the loss of bright-line rules that impose restraints on the po-
lice. As a bright-line rule to control "the potential evils of in-
communicado interrogation,"312 Miranda undoubtedly has some
deficiencies. 313 Nevertheless, the restraints Miranda does im-
pose on the police are important ones. As Professor Schulhofer
has pointed out, Miranda ensures that suspects subjected to
custodial interrogation know that the police must honor their
assertion of their rights.314 The loss of a bright-line rule that
provides this protection not only makes it more difficult to de-
termine when police tactics cross the line that separates per-
missible interrogation techniques from those that are "offensive
to a civilized system of justice," but also increases the likelihood
that the latter type of tactics will be employed.315
Thus, if Miranda were replaced by the due process volun-
tariness test, courts would have to determine whether contin-
ued interrogation of suspects who invoke the right to remain
silent or the right to have an attorney present during interro-
gation violates due process. Based on the pre-Miranda cases,
especially those decided prior to the cases foreshadowing
Miranda,316 courts would be likely to address these issues on a
case-by-case basis. In cases where the suspect can show no
more than that he was denied the right to have counsel present
311. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
312. See Stone, supra note 14, at 103.
313. See supra note 4.
314. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 880.
315. Even if abolishing Miranda's warnings and waiver requirement would
not alter the police interrogation practices, the suspect's inability to stop an
interrogation would make it more likely that interrogations would continue to
the point where they would become "offensive" to our system ofjustice.
316. See Hancock, supra note 13, at 2232-37 (observing that, although the
Court almost never overruled a due process precedent, the standards applied
to determine whether a confession was involuntary "kept changing," and that,
in view of the increasingly strict restraints on the police imposed by cases de-




during a lengthy police interrogation, pre-Miranda cases such
as Crooker v. California317 and Cicenia v. LaGay318 indicate
that courts would be unlikely to find a due process violation.
Accordingly, the loss of interrogating officers' obligation to
honor the suspect's assertion of his rights would considerably
enhance the officers' power to engage in interrogation practices
likely to exert pressure on suspects. Because of the limitations
of the case-by-case approach mandated by the due process test,
moreover, lower courts' ability to monitor and restrain these
practices would be insignificant.3 19 Without Miranda, interro-
gating officers would be relatively free to subject suspects to
skilled interrogation techniques even after the suspects indi-
cated that they wanted to avoid all such interactions with the
police.
B. POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
The abolition of Miranda's warning and waiver require-
ments would send the symbolic message to police that their in-
terrogation practices would be less scrutinized by the courts
and, therefore, their latitude to exert pressure on reluctant
suspects to confess would be greater. Police investigators
would likely interpret the abolition of Miranda's warning and
waiver requirements as an invitation to conduct longer, more
accusatorial and more manipulative forms of interrogation. At
the same time, it is likely that police managers would in their
public rhetoric respond to the abolition of the warning and
waiver requirements by insisting that their department's inter-
rogation practices had been fair and professional in the
Miranda era and would remain so in the post-Miranda era.
In practice, however, it seems likely that many, if not all,
interrogators would simply disregard the previously required
Miranda warnings altogether and commence interrogation as if
they never existed. During questioning, it is likely that inter-
rogators would not refer to the Miranda rights at all, except in
317. 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958) (holding that the defendant's confession was
voluntary even though police questioned him for several hours after denying
his request to have a specific attorney present).
318. 357 U.S. 504, 508 (1958) (holding that the defendant's confession was
voluntary and admissible despite the fact that the police denied him the op-
portunity to consult with his attorney who was present at the station house
where the defendant was being interrogated).
319. See generally KAMISAR, supra note 16, at 14-22 (elaborating as to why
the voluntariness terminology employed by the pre-Miranda due process cases
is not only "loose and unrevealing" but also "downright misleading").
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a minority of cases, when using the tactic of persuading the
suspect that the interrogator is his friend and trying to create
the appearance of extending the right to silence and the right
to counsel, even while talking the suspect out of actually in-
voking these rights.320 Of course, the extent to which police
even referred to a suspect's right to silence and/or counsel and
honored suspect invocations would likely vary by the type and
seriousness of the alleged crime, the strength of the evidence
the police already possessed, and the age, sex, race, education
and criminal record of the suspect. To the extent that interro-
gators adverted to the right to silence and the right to counsel
in the post-Miranda era at all, they would be least likely to do
so in more serious cases, such as high-profile felony cases in
which the police perceived a great deal of external pressure to
solve the crime.
Moreover, when conducting an interrogation, the police
would not have to be concerned that the suspect might termi-
nate police questioning by invoking his rights. Under Miranda,
a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation has a means of
protecting himself if he finds the police questions more difficult
than he anticipated; he may simply invoke his right to remain
silent or his right to have an attorney present, and the police
will be bound to stop questioning him.321 In some cases, the in-
terrogator's knowledge that the suspect may invoke these
rights may, by leading her to perceive that persuasion, not in-
timidation, is necessary to elicit a confession, make her less in-
clined to employ overbearing tactics.3 22 Conversely, abolishing
Miranda removes this restraint on interrogation tactics. In-
320. Even before Miranda was decided, the Inbau Interrogation Manual
advised interrogators that when dealing with a suspect who refuses to answer
questions or asks for an attorney or relative, they should concede to the sus-
pect that he has the right to remain silent. See FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111 (1962), cited in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 453 (1966). According to this edition of the
manual, "This usually has a very undermining effect. First of all, [the suspect]
is disappointed in his expectation of an unfavorable reaction on the part of the
interrogator. Secondly, a concession of this right to remain silent impresses
[him] with the apparent fairness of his interrogator." Id.
321. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74; see also supra notes 134-77 and ac-
companying text.
322. Thus, Professor Schulhofer concludes that under our current system of
interrogation "confessions are now mostly the result of persuasion and the
suspect's overconfidence, not of pressure and fear." Schulhofer, supra note 17,
at 561. If the suspect's ability to invoke his Miranda rights were eliminated, it
seems likely that a greater proportion of confessions would be precipitated by
"pressure and fear" rather than "persuasion and the suspect's overconfidence."
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stead of being concerned about the suspect's possible reaction to
her tactics, the interrogator will only need to be concerned
about a court's after-the-fact evaluation of whether the tactics
were so offensive as to violate due process.
C. GAINS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT RESULTING FROM MIRANDA'S
ABOLITION
In what categories of cases would Miranda's abolition be
most likely to assist interrogators in obtaining incriminating
statements? Since there is currently no data that clearly iden-
tifies cases in which Miranda invocations are most likely to oc-
cur, the answer to this question must necessarily be specula-
tive. We do know that suspects who presently invoke their
Miranda rights are not randomly distributed but, instead, are
more likely to have prior criminal records, especially prior fel-
ony records.3 23 What to make of this observation, however,
rests on a series of assumptions and inferences. If we assume
(1) that suspects with prior felony records would not assert a
right to remain silent or a right to counsel in the absence of
mandated Miranda warnings; (2) that, in the absence of such
warnings, interrogators could elicit confessions from those sus-
pects with prior felony records who would otherwise have in-
voked their rights; and (3) that suspects with prior felony rec-
ords tend to engage in more serious offenses than suspects
without prior records, then it is reasonable to hypothesize that
abolition of Miranda's warnings and waiver requirement would
have its greatest impact on suspects with prior felony records
and would, therefore, often have more impact in serious than
non-serious cases. In these categories of cases, Miranda's abo-
lition would be most likely to increase the likelihood that law
enforcement would obtain incriminating statements.
The extent of law enforcement's gain, however, would al-
most certainly be slight for at least three reasons. First, the
abolition of Miranda's warning and waiver requirements would
not affect the overwhelming majority of suspects-including
suspects with prior felony records-because about 80% of cus-
todial suspects already waive their Miranda rights.324 The
abolition of Miranda's warnings and waiver requirement would
thus appear to be relevant in about 20% of all cases. Second,
323. See Leo, supra note 18, at 654.
324. See Richard A. Leo, '"Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions,"
in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING, supra note 93, at 275.
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when dealing with this narrow category of cases, it is not cer-
tain that police, even operating without the restraints imposed
by Miranda, would frequently be able to elicit incriminating
statements. Taken as a group, suspects who assert their
Miranda rights may be unlikely to make incriminating state-
ments to the police under any circumstances, because they
have been hardened by exposure to the criminal justice system.
As David Simon has observed, the most hard-core criminals
know how to deal with the police: "The professionals say noth-
ing."325 Even if Miranda were abolished, the police would be
unlikely to obtain incriminating statements from this category
of suspects.
Law enforcement's gains, however slight, would also likely
vary over time. In the short term, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that the abolition of Miranda would have little effect on
suspects with prior felony records, many (if not most) of whom
would be aware, even in the absence of any Miranda warnings,
of their Fifth Amendment rights to terminate interrogation.3 26
In the long term, however, abolishing Miranda might decrease
experienced suspects' knowledge of their rights and thus in-
crease the number of incriminating admissions they are likely
to make in interrogations.
Of course, in the absence of better case data, it remains
impossible to know with any reasonable degree of precision ei-
ther the category of cases most likely to be affected by the abo-
lition of the Miranda warning and waiver requirements, or how
such cases are likely to be affected. For, even if the abolition of
the Miranda warning and waiver requirements permitted the
police to obtain more incriminating admissions in more serious
cases, the effect would almost certainly vary, based on the fol-
325. See SIMON, supra note 29, at 198. Simon elaborates as follows:
[T]he professionals say nothing. No alibis. No explanations. No ex-
pressions of polite dismay or blanket denials. In the late 1970s, when
men by the names of Dennis Wise and Vernon Collins were matching
each other body for body as Baltimore's premiere contract killers and
no witness could be found to testify against either, things got to the
point where both the detectives and their suspects knew the drill:
Enter Room.
Miranda.
Anything to say this time, Dennis?




326. See supra note 325.
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lowing factors: the length of the interrogation, the experience of
the officers conducting the interrogation, the strength of evi-
dence possessed by the police, the crime rate in the jurisdiction,
and the age, sex, race, and education of the suspect. To ade-
quately assess the impact of the abolition of Miranda on con-
fession outcomes in serious cases, scholars need to better un-
derstand the impact that the Miranda warning and waiver
requirements currently exert on different types of cases and
their outcomes. To this end, we need more and better empirical
scholarship on the real-world impact of Miranda.327
VII. CONCLUSION
If Miranda is viewed not as mandated by the Constitution,
but rather as providing safeguards designed to protect suspects'
Fifth Amendment rights,328 it is appropriate to consider
Miranda's costs to law enforcement, as well as the value of the
protections it provides to suspects subjected to custodial inter-
rogation. In assessing such costs, however, it is important to
take into account the ways in which modern interrogators have
adapted to Miranda, refining their interrogation techniques so
that, despite the obstacles posed by Miranda, they are able to
obtain statements from suspects that will be admissible if the
suspect is charged with a criminal offense.
In this Article, we have shown that individual interroga-
tors have adapted to Miranda in different ways. While some
interrogators continue to adhere to the letter of Miranda,
reading suspects the Miranda warnings in a neutral manner,
others have implemented a variety of strategies designed to
convince suspects that waiving their Miranda rights is either
an inevitable byproduct of the process or in their own best in-
terests. In addition, whereas some interrogators cease ques-
tioning as soon as a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, others
respond to this impediment to interrogation by questioning a
suspect "outside Miranda" in the hope that they will thereby
obtain statements admissible for the purpose of impeaching the
suspect's testimony if he testifies in his own defense at trial.
Empirical data relating to stratagems employed by inter-
rogators to surmount the obstacles posed by Miranda shed
light on Miranda's costs to law enforcement. Though these
stratagems are not employed by all interrogators, their use by
327. See Thomas, supra note 30, at 837.
328. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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some interrogators in some situations provides ample evidence
that when obtaining incriminating statements is most impor-
tant to the police, they are able to minimize the extent to which
Miranda imposes costs on law enforcement. In view of this
data, assessments that seek to quantify the costs of Miranda in
terms of lost confessions or lost cases should be dismissed as
insignificant. If interrogators are able to minimize Miranda's
impact in the cases that are most important to them, assessing
Miranda's impact on the basis of lost incriminating statements
in all cases-including those in which interrogators may have
failed to use sophisticated interrogation techniques because ob-
taining incriminating statements appeared unnecessary-
seems beside the point. Miranda's costs to law enforcement
can be better assessed by focusing on the extent to which
Miranda leads to lost incriminating statements in cases where
the loss of such statements is especially important to law
enforcement.
Although seeking to quantify Miranda's burden on law en-
forcement is a dubious enterprise, Miranda undoubtedly im-
poses some costs on law enforcement. Miranda's safeguards
lead to the loss of statements that would otherwise be admissi-
ble in the government's case-in-chief.329 Abolishing Miranda
would, therefore, result in at least some gains for law enforce-
ment, because the government would have a greater opportu-
nity to introduce incriminating statements that would
strengthen its case-in-chief.
Are these gains sufficient to justify abolition of Miranda's
warnings and waiver requirement? To even begin to answer
this question, we would want to know what constitutional safe-
guards would replace Miranda. If Miranda were simply re-
moved from the constitutional landscape, the due process vol-
untariness test would govern the admissibility of statements
resulting from custodial interrogation. The costs resulting from
the loss of Miranda's bright-line protection for suspects might
be considerable. Suspects subjected to custodial interrogation
would no longer be aware that the police have an obligation to
honor their assertion of rights. As a result, interrogators might
be more inclined to employ overbearing interrogation tactics,
329. From the government's perspective, obtaining statements admissible
for the purpose of impeachment is generally not as advantageous as obtaining
statements admissible in its case-in-chief. Statements admissible for im-
peachment will be admissible only if the suspect testifies in his defense and,
even then, only for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility. See, e.g.,
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971).
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and suspects, deprived of a possible means of terminating the
interrogation, might be more susceptible to their effects.
Moreover, courts seeking to regulate police interrogation prac-
tices would be required to determine the legitimacy of particu-
lar practices on a case-by-case basis, an approach that prior ex-
perience has shown to be ineffective.
In this Article, we are not taking a position on whether
Miranda's warning and waiver requirements should be over-
ruled or modified. Our point is simply that in assessing
Miranda's effects, on either law enforcement or those subjected
to police interrogation, it is vitally important to consider the
various ways in which interrogators have adapted to Miranda.
As we have shown in this Article, modern interrogators often
engage in practices that successfully overcome the obstacles to
obtaining incriminating statements posed by Miranda. This
data should be taken into account in determining Miranda's fu-
ture.
